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ABSTRACT 
On October 2013, Pertamina Hulu Energi Offshore North West Java (PHE – ONWJ) 
platform personnel found 93 leaking tubes locations in the finfan coolers/ gas-
cooling heat exchanger. After analysis had been performed, the crack in the tube 
strongly indicate that stress corrosion cracking was occurred by chloride. Chloride 
stress corrosion cracking (CLSCC) is the cracking occurred by the combined 
influence of tensile stress and a corrosive environment. CLSCC is the one of the 
most common reasons why austenitic stainless steel pipework or tube and vessels 
deteriorate in the chemical processing, petrochemical industries and maritime 
industries. In this thesis purpose to determine the appropriate inspection 
planning for two main items (tubes and header box) in the gas-cooling heat 
exchanger using risk based inspection (RBI) method. The result, inspection of the 
tubes must be performed on July 6, 2024 and for the header box inspection must 
be performed on July 6, 2025. In the end, RBI method can be applicated to gas-
cooling heat exchanger. Because, risk on the tubes can be reduced from 4.537 
m2/year to 0.453 m2/year. And inspection planning for header box can be reduced 
from 4.528 m2/year to 0.563 m2/year. 
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ABSTRAK 
Pada bulan Oktober 2013, personel anjungan lepas pantai dari  Pertamina Hulu 
Energi Offshore North West Java (PHE-ONWJ) menemukan 93 pipa yang 
terindikasi terdapat kebocoran yang terdapat pada finfan cooler/ gas cooler heat 
exchanger nya. seteah analisa mendalam dilakukan keretakan pada pipa tersebut 
dapat disimpulkan tejadi Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking (CLSCC). CLSCC 
adalah satu dari banyak sebab mengapa pipa austenitic stainless steel dan 
pressure vessel menjadi turun kualitasnya, khususnya industry yang berfokus pada 
proses kimia, industry perminyakan dan industri maritim. Tugas akhir ini 
bertujuan untuk menentukan perencanaan inspeksi terbaik pada dua bagian 
utama pada gas cooling heat exchanger (Header box dan tube) menggunakan 
metode risk based inspection (RBI). Hasilnya adalah, inspeksi pada tube atau pipa 
dapat dilakukan pada 6 Juli 2024 dan pada header box inspeksi dapat dilakukan 
pada 6 Juli 2025. Sebagai penutup, RBI dapat di lakukan pada gas cooling heat 
exchanger dikarenakan risiko pada tube/ pipa dapat diturunkan dari 4.537 
m2/tahun menjadi 0.453 m2/tahun. Dan untuk risiko pada header box dapat 
diturunkan dari 4.528 m2/tahun menjadi 0.563 m2/tahun.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Overview 
On October, 2013, Pertamina Hulu Energi Offshore North West Java (PHE – 
ONWJ) platform personnel found 93 leaking tubes reported in gas cooling 
heat exchanger (figure 1.1) on the one of Pertamina platform. This situation 
made the gas cooling heat exchanger not in a good performance. For the 
forward PHE-ONWJ need effective maintenance strategy for oil and gas 
platform equipment especially for gas cooling heat exchanger. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Gas-cooling heat exchanger leakage report (Company report, 2013)1 
 
According to the function of heat exchangers, there are view types of heat 
exchangers used in oil and gas facility, they are; shell and tube, double pipe, 
plate and frame, aerial cooler, bath type, forced air, and direct fired. (Arnold 
& Stewart, 1989) 
 
Based on the explanation above, Pertamina PHE-ONWJ gas cooling heat 
exchanger classified as areal cooler heat exchanger because its function is 
cooling the gas with a fan in to near ambient temperature. 
 
Heat exchanger is the one of crucial equipment in the processing facility 
especially in the oil and gas industry sector. Heat exchanger is used to 
transfer heat between one and more fluids. Ones of heat exchanger 
application is for cooling the gas before injected to the oil reservoir. Gas 
injection is the method to increase oil production by boosting depleted 
pressure in the reservoir (figure 1.2). Another function of gas cooling heat 
                                                 
1 Pertamina PHE-ONWJ inspection report, 2013 
2 
 
 
 
exchanger is for cooling the gas before supply the gas turbine to generated 
electric power on the platform. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 optimization oil production by gas injection method 2 
 
American Petroleum Institute (API) is the one of the most widely used 
standard guideline in oil and gas company around the world besides DNV-
GL. PHE-ONWJ as an Indonesian national oil and gas company install API 
standard for their company equipment. For the example PHE-ONWJ 
platform adopt guidelines from API 660 and API 661 for gas cooling heat 
exchanger fabrication and installation. 
 
One of maintenance strategies for gas cooling heat exchanger can be 
developed by using Risk Based Inspection (RBI). by using RBI company will 
get information using risk analysis to develop an effective inspection plan. 
Identification of company equipment is the beginning of the systematic 
process in the inspection planning. Probability of failure and consequence 
of failure are the basic formula to calculate the RBI and must be evaluated 
by considering all damage mechanism directly effect to the equipment or 
                                                 
2 http://www.rigzone.com/training/insight.asp?insight_id=345, visited on march 2017 
3 
 
 
the system. However, failure scenarios according to the actual damage 
mechanism should be develop and considered. 
 
RBI methodology produces optimal inspection planning for the asset and 
make the priority from the lower risk to the higher risk. In other word 
inspection planning in RBI focused to identification what to inspect, how to 
inspect, where to inspect and how often to inspect. Inspection planning 
used to control degradation of the asset and the company will get 
considerable impact in the system operation and the appropriate economic 
consequences. (Faber, 2001) 
  
1.2. Problems 
According to the overview above the main problems of thesis are: 
1. How to determine damage factor for the gas cooling heat exchanger 
based on RBI method? 
2. How to determine the risk level for the gas cooling heat exchanger 
based on RBI method? 
3. How to determine appropriate inspection planning with the gas cooling 
heat exchanger condition? 
4. How to determine the remaining useful life according to the risk level 
of the gas cooling heat exchanger? 
 
1.3. Limitations 
The limitations of the thesis are: 
1. Gas cooling heat exchanger which is the object of study belong to PHE-
ONWJ. 
2. All of the study and calculation based on API 581. 
3. Natural disasters are not taken into consideration. 
 
1.4. Objectives 
The objectives of this thesis are: 
1. Determine damage factor of gas cooled heat exchanger according to 
RBI method. 
2. Determine risk level of gas cooling heat exchanger. 
3. Determine remaining life according to the gas cooling heat exchanger 
risk level. 
4. Determining inspection plan for the Gas cooled heat exchanger. 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
1.5. Benefits 
The benefits of the thesis are: 
1. This thesis can be company consideration materials to determine 
priority of the maintenance and inspection strategy as a preventive 
effort to minimalized the failure. 
2. Introduce RBI as a maintenance and inspection strategy based on risk 
analyze of the pressure vessel. 
3. Improve the level of safety on the oil and gas platform. 
 
 
  
5 
 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE STUDY 
 
 
2.1. Asset Overview 
2.1.1. Gas Cooling Heat Exchanger 
2.1.1.1. Operating Principal 
As shown in figure (2.1), Gas cooling heat exchangers or aerial coolers 
are often used to cooling a hot fluid to near ambient temperature. They 
are mechanically simple and flexible. They eliminate the nuisance and 
cost of a cold source. In warm climates, aerial coolers may not be 
capable of providing as low a temperature as shell-and-tube heat 
exchangers, which use a cool medium. In aerial coolers, the tube bundle 
is on the discharge or suction side of a fan, depending on whether the 
fan is blowing air across the tubes or sucking air through them. This 
type of exchanger can be used to cool a hot fluid to something near 
ambient temperature as in a compressor inter stage cooler, or it can be 
used to heat the air as in a space heater. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 gas cooling heat exchanger operation principle3 
 
2.1.1.2. Type of Gas-Cooling Heat Exchanger 
When the tube bundle is on the discharge of the fan, the exchanger is 
referred to as “forced draft” (Figure 2.2). When the tube bundle is on 
the suction of the fan it is referred to as an “induced draft” exchanger 
(Figure 2.2). In figure 2.2 the process fluid enters one of the nozzles on 
                                                 
3
http://www.whatispiping.com//air-cooled-heat-exchanger, visited on August 2016 
6 
 
 
 
the fixed end and the pass partition plate forces it to flow through the 
tubes to the floating end (tie plate). Here it crosses over to the 
remainder of the tubes and flows back to the fixed end and out the 
other nozzle. Air is blown vertically across the finned section to cool the 
process fluid. Plugs are provided opposite each tube on both ends so 
that the tubes can be cleaned or individually plugged if they develop 
leaks, tube bundle could also be mounted in a vertical plane, in which 
case air would be blown horizontally through the cooler. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Structure of gas cooling heat exchanger (API 661, 2006) 
 
2.1.1.3. Structure of Gas Cooling Heat Exchanger 
Typically fin fan cooled exchanger consist of a finned tube bundle with 
rectangular box Headers on both end of the tubes. Cooling air is 
provided by one or more fans. Usually air blows upwards through a 
horizontal tube bundle. The fans can be either forced or induced draft 
depending on whether the air is pushed or pulled through the tube 
bundle. The space between the fans and the tube bundle is enclosed by 
a plenum chamber which directs the air. The whole assembly is usually 
mounted on legs or a pipe rack. 
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2.2. Method Overview 
2.2.1. Risk Based Inspection (RBI) 
Inspection can be interpreted as planning, implementation and evaluation 
of examinations to determine physical and metallurgical condition of 
equipment during the performance of good service. Examination 
methods including visual surveys and nondestructive test techniques, 
such as ultrasonic inspection magnetic particle inspection, radiographic 
inspection and so on, design to detect and calculate wall thinning and 
defects. 
 
The information of inspection planning in risk based inspection based on 
the risk analysis of the equipment. The purpose of the risk analysis is to 
identify the potential degradation mechanisms and threats to the 
integrity of the equipment and to assess the consequences and risk of 
failure. (J B Wintle & G J Amphlett, 2001) 
 
2.2.1.1. Risk 
Risk is defined as the combination probability of asset failure and 
consequence if the failure happened. Risk can be expressed numerically 
with formula (2.1) as shown below. 
 
 Risk = Probability x Consequence (2.1) 
 
2.2.1.2. Probability of Failure 
The probability of failure may be determined based on one, or a 
combination of the following methods: 
 
a) Structural reliability models – In this method, a limit state is defined 
based on a structural model that includes all relevant damage 
mechanisms, and uncertainties in the independent variables of this 
models are defined in terms of statistical distributions. The resulting 
model is solved directly for the probability of failure. 
b) Statistical models based on generic data – In this method, generic 
data is obtained for the component and damage mechanism under 
evaluation and a statistical model is used to evaluate the probability 
of failure. 
c) Expert judgment – In this method, expert solicitation is used to 
evaluate the component and damage mechanism, a probability of 
failure can typically only be assigned on a relative basis using this 
method. 
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In API RBI, a combination of the above is used to evaluate the 
probability of failure in terms of a generic failure frequency and damage 
factor. The probability of failure calculation is obtained from the 
equation (2.2). 
 
 Pof (t) = gff x Df (t) x FMS    (2.2) 
 
Where: 
gff       = generic failure frequency 
Df (t)   = damage factor 
FMS    = management system factor 
 
2.2.1.2.1. Generic Failure Frequency (gff) 
The generic failure frequency can be determined by industry average 
of asset failure. The generic failure frequency is expected to the 
previous failure frequency to any specific damage happening from 
exposure to the operating environment. There are four different 
damage hole sizes model the release scenarios covering a full range 
of events they are small, medium, large, and rupture. 
 
If the data of the asset is complete, actual probabilities of the failure 
could be calculated with actual observed failures. Even if a failure has 
not occurred in a component, the true probability of failure is likely to 
be greater than zero because the component may not have operated 
long enough to experience a failure. As a first step in estimating this 
non-zero probability, it is necessary to examine a larger set of data of 
similar components to find enough failures such that a reasonable 
estimate of a true probability of failure can be made. 
 
This generic component set of data is used to produce a generic 
failure frequency for the component. The generic failure frequency of 
a component type is estimated using records from all plants within a 
company or from various plants within an industry, from literature 
sources, and commercial reliability data bases. Therefore, these 
generic values typically represent an industry in general and do not 
reflect the true failure frequencies for a specific component subject to 
a specific damage mechanism. 
 
9 
 
 
The generic failure frequency is intended to be the failure frequency 
representative of failures due to degradation from relatively benign 
service prior to accounting for any specific operating environment, 
and are provided for several discrete hole sizes for various types of 
processing equipment (i.e. process vessels, drums, towers, piping 
systems, tankage, etc.). 
 
A recommended list of generic failure frequencies is provided in table 
(2.1) The generic failure frequencies are assumed to follow a log-
normal distribution, with error rates ranging from 3% to 10%. Median 
values are given in table (2.1) The data presented in the table (2.1) is 
based on the best available sources and the experience of the API RBI 
Sponsor Group. 
 
The overall generic failure frequency for each component type was 
divided across the relevant hole sizes, i.e. the sum of the generic 
failure frequency for each hole size is equal to the total generic failure 
frequency for the component. 
 
Table 2.1 Suggested Component Generic Failure Frequencies (gff) 
Equipment 
type 
Component 
type 
gff as a Function of Hole Size (failures/yr) gff(total) 
Small Medium Large Rupture (failures/yr) 
Compressor COMPC 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 0 3.00E-05 
Compressor COMPR 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05 
Heat 
Exchanger 
HEXSS 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05 
Heat 
Exchanger 
HEXTS 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05 
Heat 
Exchanger 
HEXTUBE 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05 
Pipe PIPE-1 2.80E-05 0 0 2.60E-06 3.06E-05 
Pipe PIPE-2 2.80E-05 0 0 2.60E-06 3.06E-05 
Pipe PIPE-4 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 0 2.60E-06 3.06E-05 
Pipe PIPE-6 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 0 2.60E-06 3.06E-05 
Pipe PIPE-8 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05 
Pipe PIPE-10 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05 
Pipe PIPE-12 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05 
Pipe PIPE-16 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05 
Pipe PIPEGT16 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05 
Pump PUMP2S 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05 
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Table 2.1 Suggested Component Generic Failure Frequencies (gff) (Continue) 
Equipment 
type 
Component 
type 
gff as a Function of Hole Size (failures/yr) gff(total) 
  Small Medium Large Rupture (failures/yr) 
Pump PUMPR 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05 
Pump PUMP1S 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05 
Tank650 TANKBOT 7.20E-04 0 0 2.00E-06 7.20E-04 
Tank650 COURSE-1 7.00E-05 2.50E-05 5.00E-06 1.00E-07 1.00E-04 
Tank650 COURSE-2 7.00E-05 2.50E-05 5.00E-06 1.00E-07 1.00E-04 
Tank650 COURSE-3 7.00E-05 2.50E-05 5.00E-06 1.00E-07 1.00E-04 
Tank650 COURSE-4 7.00E-05 2.50E-05 5.00E-06 1.00E-07 1.00E-04 
Tank650 COURSE-5 7.00E-05 2.50E-05 5.00E-06 1.00E-07 1.00E-04 
Tank650 COURSE-6 7.00E-05 2.50E-05 5.00E-06 1.00E-07 1.00E-04 
Tank650 COURSE-7 7.00E-05 2.50E-05 5.00E-06 1.00E-07 1.00E-04 
Tank650 COURSE-8 7.00E-05 2.50E-05 5.00E-06 1.00E-07 1.00E-04 
Tank650 COURSE-9 7.00E-05 2.50E-05 5.00E-06 1.00E-07 1.00E-04 
Tank650 COURSE-10 7.00E-05 2.50E-05 5.00E-06 1.00E-07 1.00E-04 
Vessel/ 
FinFan 
KODRUM 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05 
Vessel/ 
FinFan 
COLBTM 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05 
Vessel/ 
FinFan 
FINFAN 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05 
Vessel/ 
FinFan 
FILTER 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05 
Vessel/ 
FinFan 
DRUM 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05 
Vessel/ 
FinFan 
REACTOR 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05 
Vessel/ 
FinFan 
COLTOP 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05 
Vessel/ 
FinFan 
COLMID 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05 
 
2.2.1.2.2. Damage Mechanism or Damage Factor 
The damage factor is determined based on the applicable damage 
mechanisms (local and general corrosion, cracking, creep, etc.) 
relevant to the materials of construction and the process service, the 
physical condition of the component, and the inspection techniques 
used to quantify damage. The damage factor modifies the industry 
generic failure frequency and makes it specific to the component 
under evaluation. 
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The basic function of the damage factor is to statistically evaluate the 
amount of damage that may be present as a function of time in service 
and the effectiveness of an inspection activity to quantify that 
damage. 
 
Damage factor estimates are currently provided for the following 
damage mechanisms: 
a) Thinning (general and local) - 𝑑𝑓
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛. 
b) Component Linings - 𝑑𝑓
𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛. 
c) External Damage (corrosion and stress corrosion cracking) - 𝑑𝑓
𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑑. 
d) Stress Corrosion Cracking (internal based on process fluid, 
operating conditions and materials of construction) - 𝑑𝑓
𝑆𝐶𝐶 . 
e) High Temperature Hydrogen Attack - 𝑑𝑓
ℎ𝑡ℎ𝑎. 
f) Mechanical Fatigue (Piping Only) - 𝑑𝑓
𝑚𝑓𝑎𝑡
. 
g) Brittle Fracture (including low-temperature brittle fracture, temper 
embrittlement, 885 embrittlement, and sigma phase 
embrittlement.) - 𝑑𝑓
𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡. 
 
Damage factors are calculated based on the techniques described in 
probability of failure calculation method paragraph, but are not 
intended to reflect the actual probability of failure for the purposes of 
reliability analysis. Damage factors reflect a relative level of concern 
about the component based on the stated assumptions in each of the 
applicable paragraphs of the document. 
 
If the damage factor has combination or multiple damage mechanism 
then the rules and the formulas are as follows: 
a) Total damage factor, Df-total – If more than one damage mechanism 
is present, the following rules are used to combine the damage 
factors. The total damage factor is given by equation (2.3) when 
the thinning is local: 
 
Df-total = max[𝑑𝑓−𝑔𝑜𝑣
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 , 𝑑𝑓−𝑔𝑜𝑣
e𝑥𝑡𝑑 ] + 𝑑𝑓−𝑔𝑜𝑣
𝑆𝐶𝐶  + 𝑑𝑓−𝑔𝑜𝑣
ℎ𝑡ℎ𝑎  + 𝑑𝑓−𝑔𝑜𝑣
𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡  + 𝑑𝑓−𝑔𝑜𝑣
𝑚𝑓𝑎𝑡
 
 (2.3) 
If the thinning damage is general, then the total damage factor is 
given by equation (2.4): 
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Df-total = 𝑑𝑓
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 + 𝑑𝑓
𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑑 + 𝑑𝑓−𝑔𝑜𝑣
𝑆𝐶𝐶  + 𝑑𝑓−𝑔𝑜𝑣
ℎ𝑡ℎ𝑎  + 𝑑𝑓−𝑔𝑜𝑣
𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡  + 𝑑𝑓−𝑔𝑜𝑣
𝑚𝑓𝑎𝑡
   (2.4) 
 
*if a damage factor is less than or equal to one, then this 
damage factor shall be set to zero in the summation. 
*if Df-total is computed as less than or equal to one, then Df-total shall 
be set equal to one. 
 
b) Governing Thinning Damage Factor, Df−gov
thin  – governing thinning 
damage factor is determined based on the presence of an internal 
liner using equations (2.5) and (2.6). 
 
𝑑𝑓−𝑔𝑜𝑣
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛  = min [𝑑𝑓
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛, 𝑑𝑓
𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛] when an internal liner is present (2.5) 
 
𝑑𝑓−𝑔𝑜𝑣
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛  = 𝑑𝑓
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 when an internal liner is not present (2.6) 
 
c) Governing Stress Corrosion Cracking Damage Factor, 𝑑𝑓−𝑔𝑜𝑣
𝑆𝐶𝐶  – The 
governing stress corrosion cracking damage factor is determined 
from equation (2.7). 
 
𝑑𝑓−𝑔𝑜𝑣
𝑆𝐶𝐶  = max [𝑑𝑓
𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 , 𝑑𝑓
𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒, 𝑑𝑓
𝑆𝐶𝐶 , 𝑑𝑓
𝐻𝐼𝐶
𝑆𝑂𝐻𝐼𝐶
−𝐻2𝑆
, 𝑑𝑓
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝑑𝑓
𝑃𝑇𝐻𝐴, 
𝑑𝑓
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶 , 𝑑𝑓
𝐻𝑆𝐶−𝐻𝐹 , 𝑑𝑓
𝐻𝐼𝐶
𝑆𝑂𝐻𝐼𝐶
− 𝐻𝐹
]    (2.7) 
 
d) Governing External Damage Factor, df−gov
extd , governing external 
damage factor is determined from equation (2.8). 
 
𝑑𝑓−𝑔𝑜𝑣
extd  = max [ 𝑑𝑓
𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑑 , 𝑑𝑓
𝐶𝑈𝐼𝐹, 𝑑𝑓
𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑑−𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶 , 𝑑𝑓
𝐶𝑈𝐼−𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶]  (2.8) 
 
e) Governing Brittle Fracture Damage Factor, 𝑑𝑓−𝑔𝑣
𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡  The governing 
brittle fracture damage factor is determined from equation (2.9). 
 
𝑑𝑓−𝑔𝑜𝑣
𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡  = max [(𝑑𝑓
𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡
+𝑑𝑓
𝑡empe
), 𝑑𝑓
885, 𝑑𝑓
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎
)    (2.9) 
 
*if a damage factor is less than or equal to one (i.e. the damage is 
inactive), then this damage factor shall be set to zero in the 
summation. 
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Table 2.2 damage factor defined 
Damage Factor Variable Damage Factor Description 
𝑑𝑓
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 
Damage factor for general and localized 
thinning 
𝐷𝑓
𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟 
Damage factor of inorganic and organis linings 
for all component types 
𝐷𝑓`
𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 Damage factor for caustic cracking 
𝐷𝑓
𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒 Damage factor for amine cracking 
𝐷𝑓
𝑠𝑠𝑐 
Damage factor for sulfide stress corrosion 
cracking 
𝐷𝑓
𝐻𝐼𝐶−𝑆𝑂𝐻𝐼𝐶−𝐻2𝑆 
Damage factor for HIC/SOHIC cracking in H2S 
environments 
𝐷𝑓
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 Damage factor for carbonate cracking 
𝐷𝑓
𝑃𝑇𝐴 
Damage factor for polythionic acid cracking in 
austenitic stainless steel and nonferrous alloy 
components 
𝐷𝑓
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶 
Damage factor for chloride stress corrosion 
cracking 
𝐷𝑓
𝐻𝑆𝐶−𝐻𝐹 
Damage factor for hydrogen stress cracking in 
HF environment 
𝐷𝑓
HIC/SOHIC−HF
 
Damage factor for HIC/SOHIC cracking in HF 
environments 
𝐷𝑓
𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑜𝑟 
Damage factor for external corrosion on ferritic 
components 
𝐷𝑓
𝐶𝑈𝐼𝐹 
Damage factor for CUI on insulted ferritic 
components 
𝐷𝑓
𝑒𝑥𝑡−𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶 
Damage factor for external chloride stress 
corrosion cracking on austenitic stainless steel 
components 
𝐷𝑓
𝐶𝑈𝐼−𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶 
Damage factor for external chloride stress 
corrosion cracking on austenitic stainless steel 
insulated components 
𝐷𝑓
ℎ𝑡ℎ𝑎 
Damage factor for high temperature hydrogen 
attack 
𝐷𝑓
𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡
 
Damage factor for brittle fracture of carbon 
steel and low alloy components 
𝐷𝑓
𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒
 
Damage factor for temper embrittlement of Cr-
Mo low alloy components 
𝐷𝑓
885 Damage factor for 885 embrittlement 
𝐷𝑓
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎
 Damage factor for sigma phase embrittlement 
𝐷𝑓
𝑚𝑓𝑎𝑡
 Damage factor for mechanical fatigue 
 
2.2.1.2.3. Inspection Effectiveness Category 
Damage factors are determined as a function of inspection 
effectiveness. There are five categories of inspection effectiveness, 
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which is shown in table (2.3) The inspection effectiveness categories 
presented are meant to be examples and provide a guideline for 
assigning actual inspection effectiveness. 
 
Inspections are ranked according to their expected effectiveness at 
detecting damage and correctly predicting the rate of damage. The 
actual effectiveness of a given inspection technique depends on the 
characteristics of the damage mechanism. 
 
The effectiveness of each inspection performed within the designated 
time period is characterized for each damage mechanism. The 
number of highest effectiveness inspections will be used to determine 
the damage factor. If multiple inspections of a lower effectiveness 
have been conducted during the designated time period, they can be 
approximated to an equivalent higher effectiveness inspection in 
accordance with the following relationships: 
a) 2 Usually Effective (B) Inspections = 1 Highly Effective (A) 
Inspection, or 2B = 1A 
b) 2 Fairly Effective (C) Inspections = 1 Usually Effective (B) 
Inspection, or 2C = 1B 
c) 2 Poorly Effective (D) Inspections = 1 Fairly Effective (C) Inspection, 
or 2D = 1C 
 
*Note that these equivalent higher inspection rules shall not be 
applied to No Inspections (E). 
 
Table 2.3 Inspection Effectiveness Categories 
Quantitative Inspection 
Effectiveness Category 
Description 
Highly Effective 
The inspection methods will correctly identify the 
true damage state in nearly every case (or 80-
100% confidence). 
Usually Effective 
The inspection methods will correctly identify the 
true damage state most of time (or 60-80% 
confidence). 
Fairly Effective 
The inspection methods will correctly identify the 
true damage state about half of time (or 40-60% 
confidence). 
Poorly Effective 
The inspection methods will provide little 
information to correctly identify the true damage 
state (or 20-40% confidence). 
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Table 2.3 Inspection Effectiveness Categories (continue) 
Quantitative Inspection 
Effectiveness Category 
Description 
Ineffective 
The inspection methods will provide no or almost 
no information that will correctly identify the true 
damage state and are considered ineffective for 
detecting the spesific damage mechanism (less 
than 20% confidence). 
 
2.2.1.2.4. Management System Factor (fms) 
Management system factor used to measure how good the facility 
management system that may arise due to an accident and labor force 
of the plant is trained to handle the asset. This evaluation consists of 
a series of interviews with plant management, operations, inspection, 
maintenance, engineering, training, and safety personnel. 
 
The management systems evaluation procedure developed for API 
RBI covers all areas of a plant’s PSM system that impact directly or 
indirectly on the mechanical integrity of process equipment. The 
management systems evaluation is based in large part on the 
requirements contained in API Recommended Practices and 
Inspection Codes. It also includes other proven techniques in effective 
safety management. A listing of the subjects covered in the 
management systems evaluation and the weight given to each subject 
is presented in table (2.4). 
 
Table 2.4 Management Systems Evaluation 
Table Title Questions Points 
2.A.1 Leadership and Administration 6 70 
2.A.2 Process Safety Information 10 80 
2.A.3 Process Hazard Analysis 9 100 
2.A.4 Management of Change 6 80 
2.A.5 Operating Procedures 7 80 
2.A.6 Safe Work Practices 7 85 
2.A.7 Training 8 100 
2.A.8 Mechanical Integrity 20 120 
2.A.9 Pre-Startup Safety Review 5 60 
2.A.10 Emergency Response 6 65 
2.A.11 Incident Investigation 9 75 
2.A.12 Contractors 5 45 
2.A.13 Audits 4 40 
Total 102 1000 
Note: Tabels 2.A.1 through 2.A.13 are located in Annex 2.A. 
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The management systems evaluation covers a wide range of topics 
and, as a result, requires input from several different disciplines within 
the facility to answer all questions. Ideally, representatives from the 
following plant functions should be interviewed: 
a) Plant Management 
b) Operations 
c) Maintenance 
d) Safety 
e) Inspection 
f) Training 
g) Engineering 
 
The scale recommended for converting a management systems 
evaluation score to a management systems factor is based on the 
assumption that the “average” plant would score 50% (500 out of a 
possible score of 1000) on the management systems evaluation, and 
that a 100% score would equate to a one order-of magnitude 
reduction in total unit risk. Based on this ranking, Equation (2.10) may 
be used to compute a management systems factor, 𝐹𝑀𝑆, for any 
management systems evaluation score. 
 
*Note that the management score must first be converted to a 
percentage (between 0 and 100) as follows: 
  
𝑝𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =  
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
1000
 𝑥 100 [𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑠 %]    
 
𝐹𝑀𝑆 = 10
(−0.02𝑝𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒+1) (2.10) 
 
The approximate formula above can be modified and improved over 
time as more data become available on management systems 
evaluation results. It should be remembered that the management 
systems factor applies equally to all components and, therefore, does 
not change the risk ranking of components for inspection 
prioritization.  
 
2.2.1.2.5. Thinning 
Thinning damage factor calculation estimates the percentage of asset 
wall loss. A statistical distribution is applied to a thinning corrosion 
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rate over time, accounting for the variability of the actual thinning 
corrosion rate which can be greater than the rate assigned. The 
amount of uncertainty in the corrosion rate is determined by the 
number and effectiveness of inspections and the on-line monitoring 
that has been performed. Confidence that the assigned corrosion rate 
is the rate that is experienced in-service increases with more thorough 
inspection, a greater number of inspections, and/or more relevant 
information gathered through the on-line monitoring. The DF is 
updated based on increased confidence in the measured corrosion 
rate provided by using Bayes Theorem and the improved knowledge 
of the component condition. (L.C. Kaley, 2014) 
 
The calculation procedures of thinning damage factor are: 
a) Determine the number of inspections, and the corresponding 
inspection effectiveness category for all past inspections. Combine 
the inspections to the highest effectiveness performed. 
b) Determine the time in-service (age) since the last inspection 
thickness reading (trd). 
c) Determine the corrosion rate for the base metal (Cr,bm) based on 
the material of construction and process environment, where the 
component has cladding, a corrosion rate (Cr,cm) must also be 
obtained for the cladding. 
d) Determine the minimum required wall thickness (𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛) per the 
original construction code or using API 579. If the component is a 
tank bottom, then in accordance with API 653 (𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0.1 in) if the 
tank does not have a release prevention barrier and (𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0.05 
in) if the tank has a release prevention barrier.  
e) For clad components, calculate the time or age from the last 
inspection required to corrode away the clad material, 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑐 , 
using equation (2.11).  
 
𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑐 = max [(
𝑡𝑟𝑑−𝑡
𝐶𝑟,𝑐𝑚
), 0.0] = N/A 2.11 
 
f) Determine the 𝐴𝑟𝑡 parameter using Equation (2.12) or (2.13), 
based on the age and from step 2.2.1.2.5.b, from step 2.2.1.2.5.c, 
from step 2.2.1.2.5.d and the age required to corrode away the 
cladding, 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑐 , if applicable from step 2.2.1.2.5.e. For 
components without cladding, and for components where the 
18 
 
 
 
cladding is corroded away at the time of the last inspection (i.e. 
𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑐 = 0.0), use Equation (2.12). 
 
𝐴𝑟𝑡 = max[1 −
𝑡𝑟𝑑− 𝐶𝑟,𝑐𝑚 ∙ 𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛+𝐶𝐴
, 0.0] 2.12 
 
g) Determine the damage factor for thinning, 𝐷𝑓
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛, using Equation 
(2.13). 
 
𝐷𝑓
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 = 
𝐷𝑓𝑏
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛∙ 𝐹𝐼𝑃∙ 𝐹𝐷𝐿 ∙ 𝐹𝑊𝐷 ∙ 𝐹𝐴𝑀 ∙ 𝐹𝑆𝑀 
𝐹𝑂𝑀
 2.13 
 
2.2.1.2.6. Stress Corrosion Cracking (CL-SCC) 
Chloride stress corrosion cracking (CLSCC) is one of the most common 
reasons why austenitic stainless steel pipework and vessels 
deteriorate in the chemical processing and petrochemical industries. 
SCC is an insidious form of corrosion; it produces a marked loss of 
mechanical strength with little metal loss; the damage is not obvious 
to casual inspection and the stress corrosion cracks can trigger 
mechanical fast fracture and catastrophic failure of components and 
structures. Several major disasters have involved stress corrosion 
cracking, including the rupture of high-pressure gas transmission 
pipes, the explosion of boilers, and the destruction of power stations 
and oil refineries. (National Physical Laboratory, 2000) 
 
The calculation procedures of chloride stress corrosion cracking (CL-
SCC) damage factor are: 
a) Determine the number of inspections, and the corresponding 
inspection effectiveness category for all past inspections. Combine 
the inspections to the highest effectiveness performed. 
b) Determine the time in-service (age) since the last Level A, B, C or 
D inspection was performed. 
c) Determine the susceptibility for cracking using table 2.5 based on 
the operating temperature and concentration of the chloride ions. 
Note that a HIGH susceptibility should be used if cracking is 
known to be present. 
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Table 2.5 Susceptibility to Cracking – CLSCC 
pH ≤ 10 
Temperature 
(°C) 
Susceptibility to Cracking as a Function of Chloride ion 
(ppm) 
1-10  11-100 101-1000 >1000 
38 – 66 Low Medium Medium High 
>66 – 93 Medium Medium High High 
>93 – 149 Medium High High High 
pH > 10 
Temperature 
(°C) 
Susceptibility to Cracking as a Function of Chloride ion 
(ppm) 
 1-10 11-100 101-1000 >1000 
< 93 Low Low Low Low 
93 -149 Low Low Low Medium 
 
d) Based on the susceptibility in step 2.2.1.2.6.c, and determine the 
severity index, 𝑆𝑉𝐼 from table 2.6. 
 
Table 2.6 Determination of Severity Index – CLSCC 
Susceptibility Severity Index – SVI 
High 5000 
Medium 500 
Low 50 
None 1 
 
e) Determine the base damage factor for CLSCC, 𝐷𝑓𝑏
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶 using table 
2.7 based on the number of, and the highest inspection 
effectiveness determined in step 2.2.1.2.6.a, and the severity index, 
𝑆𝑉𝐼, from step 2.2.1.2.6.d. 
 
Table 2.7 SCC Damage Factors – All SCC Mechanisms 
SVI 
Inspection Effectiveness 
E 
1 Inspection 2 Inspections 3 Inspections 
D C B A D C B A D C B A 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
10 10 8 3 1 1 6 2 1 1 4 1 1 1 
50 50 40 17 5 3 30 10 2 1 20 5 1 1 
100 100 80 33 10 5 60 20 4 1 40 10 2 1 
500 500 400 170 50 25 300 100 20 5 200 50 8 1 
1000 1000 800 330 100 50 600 200 40 10 400 100 16 2 
5000 5000 4000 1670 500 250 3000 1000 250 50 2000 500 80 10 
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f) Calculate the escalation in the damage factor based on the time 
in-service since the last inspection using the age from STEP 2 and 
equation (2.14). In this equation, it is assumed that the probability 
for cracking will increase with time since the last inspection as a 
result of increased exposure to upset conditions and other non-
normal conditions. 
 
𝐷𝑓
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶 = 𝐷𝑓𝐵
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶 (age)1.1 2.14 
 
2.2.1.3. Consequences of Failure 
The consequences of failure are the result if the asset getting failure. 
According to API RBI, consequences of failure assessment is performed 
to determining a ranking of equipment items on the basis of risk. There 
are four consequence categories such as; flammable, toxic 
consequences, non-flammable and non-toxic release and financial 
consequence. API RBI also provide two level consequences of failure 
methodology. 
 
2.2.1.3.1. Consequence Categories 
The major consequence categories are analyzed using different 
technique. 
a) Flammable and explosive consequences are calculated using 
event trees to determine the probabilities of various outcomes 
(e.g., pool fires, flash fires, vapor cloud explosions), combined with 
computer modeling to determine the magnitude of the 
consequence. Consequence areas can be determined based on 
serious personnel injuries and component damage from thermal 
radiation and explosions. Financial losses are also determined 
based on the area affected by the release. 
b) Toxic consequences are calculated using computer modeling to 
determine the magnitude of the consequence area as a result of 
overexposure of personnel to toxic concentrations within a vapor 
cloud. Where fluids are flammable and toxic, the toxic event 
probability assumes that if the release is ignited, the toxic 
consequence is negligible (i.e. toxics are consumed in the fire). 
Financial losses are also determined based on the area affected by 
the release. 
c) Non-flammable, non-toxic releases are also considered since they 
can still result in serious consequences. Consequences from 
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chemical splashes and high temperature steam burns are 
determined based on serious injuries to personnel. Physical 
explosions and BLEVEs can also cause serious personnel injuries 
and component damage. 
d) Financial Consequences includes losses due to business 
interruption and costs associated with environmental releases. 
Business interruption consequences are estimated as a function of 
the flammable and non-flammable consequence area results. 
Environmental consequences are determined directly from the 
mass available for release or from the release rate. 
 
2.2.1.3.2. Methodology of Consequence Analysis 
2.2.1.3.2.1. Level 1 Consequence Analysis 
The Level 1 consequence analysis can be used for a limited number 
of representative fluids. This simplified method contains table 
lookups and graphs that can readily be used to calculate the 
consequence of releases without the need of specialized 
consequence modeling software or techniques. 
 
The following simplifying assumptions are made in the Level 1 
consequence analysis: 
a) The fluid phase upon release can only be either a liquid or a gas, 
depending on the storage phase and the phase expected to 
occur upon release to the atmosphere, in general, no 
consideration is given to the cooling effects of flashing liquid, 
rainout, jet liquid entrainment or two-phase. 
b) Fluid properties for representative fluids containing mixtures are 
based on average values (e.g. MW, NBP, density, specific heats, 
AIT) 
c) Probabilities of ignition, as well as the probabilities of other 
release events (VCE, pool fire, jet fire, etc.) have been pre-
determined for each of the representative fluids as a function of 
temperature, fluid AIT and release type. These probabilities are 
constants, totally independent of the release rate. 
 
Consequence calculation procedures for level 1 consequence 
analysis are; determine the representative fluid and associated 
properties, determine release hole size selection, determine release 
rate calculation, estimate the fluid inventory available for release, 
determine the release type (continuous or instantaneous), estimate 
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the impact of detection and isolation systems on release magnitude, 
determine the release rate and mass for consequence analysis, 
determine flammable and explosive consequences.  
 
2.2.1.3.2.1.1. Calculation Procedures of Determining the Representative 
Fluid and Associated Properties 
The calculation procedures are: 
a) Select a representative fluid group from table (2.8). 
 
Table 2.8 List of Representative Fluids Available for Level 1 Analysis 
Representative 
Fluid 
Fluid TYPE Examples of Applicable Materials 
C₁-C₂ TYPE 0 methane, ethane, ethylene, LNG, fuel gas 
C₃-C₄ TYPE 0 propane, butane, isobutane, LPG 
C₅ TYPE 0 Pentane 
C₆-C₈ TYPE 0 gasoline, naptha, light stright run, heptane 
C₉-C₁₂ TYPE 0 diesel, kerosene 
C₁₃-C₁₆ TYPE 0 jet fuel, kerosene, atmospheric gas oil 
C₁₇-C₂₅ TYPE 0 gas oil, typical crude 
C₂₅₊ TYPE 0 residuum, heavy crude, lube oil, seal oil 
H₂ TYPE 0 hydrogen only 
H₂S TYPE 0 hydrogen sulfide only 
HF TYPE 0 hydrogen fluoride 
Water TYPE 0 Water 
Steam TYPE 0 Steam 
acid (low) TYPE 0 acid, caustic 
Aromatics TYPE 1 benzene, toluene, xylene, cumene 
AICl3 TYPE 0 aluminum chloride 
Pyrophoric TYPE 0 pyrophoric materials 
Ammonia TYPE 0 Ammonia 
Chlorine TYPE 0 Chlorine 
CO TYPE 1 carbon monoxide 
DEE 
TYPE 1 (see 
note 2) 
diethyl ether 
HCL 
TYPE 0 (see 
note 1) 
hydrogen chloride 
nitric acid 
TYPE 0 (see 
note 1) 
nitric acid 
NO₂ 
TYPE 0 (see 
note 1) 
nitrogen dioxide 
Phosgene TYPE 0 Phosgene 
TDI 
TYPE 0 (see 
note 1) 
toluene diisocyanate 
Methanol TYPE 1 Methanol 
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Table 2.8 List of Representative Fluids Available for Level 1 Analysis 
(Continue) 
PO TYPE 1 propylene oxide 
Styrene TYPE 1 Styrene 
EEA TYPE 1 ethylene glycol monoethyl ether acetate 
EE TYPE 1 ethylene glycol monoethyl ether 
EG TYPE 1 ethylene glycol 
EO TYPE 1 ethylene oxide 
Notes: 
1. HCL, Nitric Acid, NO₂, and TDI are TYPE 1 toxic fluids 
2. DEE is a TYPE 0 toxic fluid 
 
b) Determine the stored fluid phase; Liquid or Vapor. 
c) Determine the stored fluid properties. 
- MW – Molecular weight, kg/kg-mol [lb/lb-mol], can be 
estimated from table (2.9). 
- k – Ideal gas specific heat ratio, can be estimated using 
equation (2.15) and the P C values as determined using table 
(2.9). 
𝑘 =
𝐶𝑝
𝐶𝑝−𝑅
 2.15 
- AIT – Auto-ignition temperature, K [°R], can be estimated from 
table (2.9). 
 
Table 2.9 Properties of the Representative Fluids Used in Level 1 Analysis 
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C₁-C₂ 23 250.512 -125 Gas Note 1 12.3 1.15E-01 -2.87E-05 -1.30E-09 N/A 558 
C₃-C₄ 51 538.379 -21 Gas Note 1 2.632 0.3188 -1.35E+04 1.47E-08 N/A 369 
C₅ 72 625.199 36 Liquid Note 1 -3.626 0.4873 -2.60E-04 5.30E-08 N/A 284 
C₆-C₈ 100 684.018 99 Liquid Note 1 -5.146 6.76E-01 -3.65E-04 7.66E-08 N/A 223 
C₉-C₁₂ 149 734.012 184 Liquid Note 1 -8.5 1.01E+00 -5.56E-04 1.18E-07 N/A 208 
C₁₃-C₁₆ 205 764.527 261 Liquid Note 1 -11.7 1.39E+00 -7.72E-04 1.67E-07 N/A 202 
C₁₇-C₂₅ 280 775.019 344 Liquid Note 1 -22.4 1.94E+00 -1.12E-03 -2.53E-07 N/A 202 
C₂₅₊ 422 900.026 527 Liquid Note 1 -22.4 1.94E+00 -1.12E-03 -2.53E-07 N/A 202 
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d) Determine the steady state phase of the fluid after release to 
the atmosphere, using table (2.10) and the phase of the fluid 
stored in the equipment as determined in step 2.2.1.3.2.1.1.b. 
 
Table 2.10 Consequence Analysis Guidelines for Determining the Phase of a Fluid 
Phase of Fluid at 
Normal Operating 
(Storage) 
Conditions 
Phase of Fluid at 
Ambient (after 
release) Conditions 
API RBI Determination of Final Phase 
for Consequence Calculation 
Gas Gas model as gas 
Gas Liquid model as gas 
Liquid Gas 
model as gas unless the fluid boiling 
point at ambient conditions is greater 
than 80°F, then model as a liquid 
Liquid Liquid model as liquid 
 
2.2.1.3.2.1.2. Calculation Procedure of Release Hole Size Selection 
The calculation procedures are: 
a) Based on the component type and table (2.11), determine the 
release hole size diameters (dn). 
b) Determine the generic failure frequency (gffn), and the total 
generic failure frequency from this table or from equation 
(2.16). 
𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = ∑ 𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑛
4
𝑛−1  2.16 
 
Table 2.11 Release Hole Sizes and Area used 
Release Hole 
Number 
Release Hole Size Range of Hole 
Diameters (mm) 
Release Hole 
Diameter, dn (mm) 
1 Small 0 – 6.4 D1 = 6.4 
2 Medium >6.4 – 51 D2 = 25 
3 Large >51 – 152 D3 = 102 
4 Rupture >152 D4 = min[D, 406] 
 
2.2.1.3.2.1.3. Calculation Procedure of Release Rate Calculation 
The calculation procedures are: 
a) Select the appropriate release rate equation as described 
above using the stored fluid phase 
b) For each release hole size, compute the release hole size area 
(An) using Equation (2.17) based on dn. 
 
𝐴𝑛 = 
𝜋 𝑑𝑛
2
4
 2.17 
 
25 
 
 
c) For each release hole size, calculate the release rate (Wn) with 
equation 2.18 for each release area (An) 
 
𝑊𝑛 = 
𝐶𝑑
𝐶2
 x 𝐴𝑛 x 𝑃𝑠 x √(
𝑘 𝑥 𝑀𝑊 𝑥 𝑔𝑐
𝑅 𝑥 𝑇𝑠
)𝑥 (
2
𝑘+1
)
𝑘
𝑘−1
 2.18 
 
2.2.1.3.2.1.4. Calculation Procedure of Estimate the Fluid Inventory 
Available for Release (Available Mass) 
The Calculation procedures are: 
a) Group components and equipment items into inventory 
groups (table 2.12) 
b) Calculate the fluid mass (masscomp) in the component being 
evaluated. 
c) Calculate the fluid mass in each of the other components that 
are included in the inventory group (masscomp,i). 
d) Calculate the fluid mass in the inventory group (massinv) using 
Equation (2.19) 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑣 =  ∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝,𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1    2.19 
 
Table 2.12 Assumption When Calculating Liquid Inventories Within Equipment 
Equipment 
Description 
Component 
Type 
Examples 
Default Liquid Volume 
Percent 
Process Columns two 
or three items) 
 
 - top half 
- middle section 
- bottom half 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COLTOP 
COLMID 
COLBTM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Distillation Columns, 
FCC Main 
Fractionator, Splitter 
Tower, Debutanizer, 
Packed Columns 
Liquid/Liquid 
Columns  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25% 
25% 
37% 
These default values are 
typical of trayed distillation 
columns and consider liquid 
holdup at the bottom of the 
vessel as well as the 
presence of chimney trays 
in the upper sections 
Accumulators and 
Drums 
 
 
 
DRUM 
 
 
 
 
OH Accumulators, 
Feed Drums, HP/LP 
Separators, Nitrogen 
Storage drums, 
Steam Condensate 
Drums 
50% liquid 
 
Typically, 2-phase drums 
are liquid level controlled at 
50% 
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Table 2.12 Assumption When Calculating Liquid Inventories Within 
Equipment (Continue) 
Equipment 
Description 
Component 
Type 
Examples 
Default Liquid Volume 
Percent 
Knock-out Pots and 
Dryers 
 
 
KODRUM 
 
 
 
Compressor Knock-
outs, Fuel Gas KO 
Drums, Flare Drums, 
Air Dryers. 
 
10% liquid 
Much less liquid inventory 
expected in knock-out 
drums 
Compressors 
 
COMPC 
COMPR 
COMPR 
Centrifugal and 
Reciprocating 
Compressors 
Negligible, 0% 
 
Heat Exchangers 
 
HEXSS 
HEXTS 
Shell and Tube Heat 
Exchangers 
50% shell-side, 25% tube-
side 
Fin Fan Air Coolers 
 
FINFAN 
 
Total Condensers, 
Partial Condensers, 
Vapor Coolers and 
Liquid Coolers 
25% liquid 
 
Filters FILTER  100% full 
Piping PIPE-xx  
100% full, calculated for 
Level 2 Analysis 
 
e) Calculate the flow rate from a 203 mm [8 in] diameter hole 
(Wmax8) using equations (2.18), as applicable, with 8 32,450 n A 
= A = mm2 [50.3 in2]. This is the maximum flow rate that can 
be added to the equipment fluid mass from the surrounding 
equipment in the inventory group. 
f) For each release hole size, calculate the added fluid mass 
(massadd,n) resulting from three minutes of flow from the 
inventory group using equation (2.20) where Wn is the leakage 
rate for the release hole size being evaluated and Wmax8 is from 
last step.  
 
massadd,n = 180 . min [Wn , Wmax8] 2.20 
 
g) For each release hole size, calculate the available mass for 
release using Equation (2.21) 
 
Massavail,n = min[{masscomp + massadd,n}, massinv] 2.21 
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2.2.1.3.2.1.5. Calculation Procedure of Determining the Release Type 
(Continuous or Instantaneous) 
The Calculation procedures are: 
a) For each release hole size, calculate the time required to 
release 4,536 kgs [10,000 lbs] of fluid. 
 
𝑡𝑛 =
𝐶3
𝑊𝑛
 2.22 
 
b) For each release hole size, determine if the release type is 
instantaneous or continuous using the following criteria. 
- If the release hole size is 6.35 mm [0.25 inches] or less, then 
the release type is continuous. 
- If 180 tn ≤ sec or the release mass is greater than 4,536 kgs 
[10,000 lbs], then the release is instantaneous; otherwise, the 
release is continuous. 
 
2.2.1.3.2.1.6. Estimate the Impact of Detection and Isolation Systems on 
Release Magnitude 
The Calculation procedures are: 
a) Determine the detection and isolation systems present in the 
unit. 
b) Using table (2.13), select the appropriate classification (A, B, C) 
for the detection system.  
 
Table 2.13 Detection and Isolation System Rating Guide 
Type of Detection System 
Detection 
Classification 
Instrumentation designed specifically to detect material losses 
by changes in operating conditions (i.e., loss of pressure or 
flow) in the system 
A 
Suitably located detectors to determine when the material is 
present outside the pressure-containing envelope 
B 
Visual detection, cameras, or detectors with marginal coverage C 
Type of Isolation System 
Isolation 
Classification 
Isolation or shutdown systems activated directly from process 
instrumentation or detectors, with no operator intervention 
A 
Isolation or shutdown systems activated by operators in the 
control room or other suitable locations remote from the leak 
B 
Isolation dependent on manually-operated valves C 
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c) Using table (2.13), select the appropriate classification (A, B, C) 
for the isolation system. 
d) Using (2.14) and the classifications determined in step 
2.2.1.3.2.1.6.b & 2.2.1.3.2.1.6.c, determine the release 
reduction factor, factdi.  
 
Table 2.14 Adjustments to Release Based on Detection and Isolation 
Systems 
System 
Classifications Release Magnitude Adjustment 
Reduction 
Factor, 
factdi Detection Isolation 
A A Reduce release rate or mass by 25% 0.25 
A B Reduce release rate or mass by 20% 0.20 
A or B C Reduce release rate or mass by 10% 0.10 
B B Reduce release rate or mass by 15% 0.15 
C C 
No adjustment to release rate to 
mass 0.00 
 
e) Using table (2.15) and the classifications determined in step 
2.2.1.3.2.1.6.b & 2.2.1.3.2.1.6.c, determine the total leak 
durations for each of the selected release hole sizes, ldmax,n. 
 
Table 2.15 Leak Durations Based on Detection and Isolation Systems 
Detecting 
System Rating 
Isolation System 
Rating 
Maximum Leak Duration, ldmax 
A A 
20 minutes for 6.4 mm leaks 
10 minutes for 25 mm leaks 
5 minutes for 102 mm leaks 
A B 
30 minutes for 6.4 mm leaks 
20 minutes for 25 mm leaks 
10 minutes for 102 mm leaks 
A C 
40 minutes for 6.4 mm leaks 
30 minutes for 25 mm leaks 
20 minutes for 102 mm leaks 
B A or B 
40 minutes for 6.4 mm leaks 
30 minutes for 25 mm leaks 
20 minutes for 102 mm leaks 
B C 
1 hour for 6.4 mm leaks 
30 minutes for 25 mm leaks 
20 minutes for 102 mm leaks 
C A, B or C 
1 hour for 6.4 mm leaks 
40 minutes for 25 mm leaks 
20 minutes for 102 mm leaks 
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2.2.1.3.2.1.7. Determining the Release Rate and Mass for Consequence 
Analysis 
The Calculation Procedure are: 
a) For each release hole size, calculate the adjusted release rate 
(raten) using Equation 4.12 where the theoretical release rate 
(Wn) is from step 4.4.3.b. Note that the release reduction factor 
(factdi) determined in step 4.4.6.d accounts for any detection 
and isolation systems that are present. 
 
raten = Wn(1-factdi) 2.23 
 
b) For each release hole size, calculate the leak duration (ldn) of 
the release using Equation 4.13, based on the available mass 
(massavail,n), and the adjusted release rate (raten) Note that the 
leak duration cannot exceed the maximum duration (Idmax,n) 
determined in step 2.2.1.3.2.1.6.e. 
 
𝑙𝑑𝑛 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 [{
𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙,𝑛
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
} , {60𝑥𝐼𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑛}] 2.24 
 
c) For each release hole size, calculate the release mass (massn) , 
using equation (4.14) based on the release rate (raten) from 
step 2.2.1.3.2.1.3.b, the leak duration (ldn) , from step 
2.2.1.3.2.1.7.b, and the available mass (massavail,n) from step 
2.2.1.3.2.1.4.f. 
 
massn = min [{raten . ldn} , massavail,n] 2.25 
 
2.2.1.3.2.1.8. Flammable and Explosive Consequence 
The Calculation Procedure are: 
a) Select the consequence area mitigation reduction factor 
(factmit) from table (2.16). 
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Table 2.16 Adjustments to Flammable Consequences for Mitigation 
Systems 
Mitigation System 
Consequence 
Area 
Adjustment 
Consequensce 
Area Reduction 
Factor, factmit 
Inventory blowdown, coupled with 
isolation system classification B or 
higher 
Reduce 
consequence 
area by 25% 
0.25 
Fire water deluge system and monitors 
Reduce 
consequence 
area by 20% 
0.20 
Fire water monitors only 
Reduce 
consequence 
area by 5% 
0.05 
Foam spray system 
Reduce 
consequence 
area by  15% 
0.15 
 
b) For each release hole size, calculate the energy efficiency 
correction factor, eneffn , using equation (2.26). 
 
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑛 = 4 𝑥 𝑙𝑜𝑔10[𝐶4 𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑛] – 15 2.26 
 
c) Determine the fluid type, either TYPE 0 or TYPE 1 from table 
(2.8). 
d) For each release hole size, compute the component damage 
consequence areas for Autoignition Not Likely, Continuous 
Release (AINL-CONT) (𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇). 
1) Determine the appropriate constants a (𝑎𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇) and b 
(𝑏𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇) from the table (2.17) The release phase as 
determined in step 2.2.1.3.2.1.1.d. will be needed to assure 
selection of the correct constants. 
2) If the release is a gas or vapor and the fluid type is TYPE 0, then 
use Equation (2.27) for the consequence area and Equation 
(2.28) for the release rate. 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 𝑎(𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛)
𝑏 x (1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡) 2.27 
 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛 2.28 
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Table 2.17 Component Damage Flammable Consequence 
Equation Constants 
Fluid 
Continuous Releases Constants 
Auto-Ignition Not Likely Auto-Ignition Likely 
(CAINL) (CAIL) 
Gas Liquid Gas Liquid 
a b a B A b a B 
C₁-C₂ 8.669 0.98     55.13 0.95     
C₃-C₄ 10.13 1.00     64.23 1.00     
C₅ 5.115 0.99 100.6 0.89 62.41 1.00     
C₆-C₈ 5.846 0.98 34.17 0.89 63.98 1.00 103.4 0.95 
C₉-C₁₂ 2.419 0.98 24.6 0.90 76.98 0.95 110.3 0.95 
C₁₃-C₁₆     12.11 0.90     196.7 0.92 
C₁₇-C₂₅     3.785 0.90     165.5 0.92 
C₂₅₊     2.098 0.91     103.0 0.90 
H₂ 13.13 0.992     86.02 1.00     
H₂S 6.554 1.00     38.11 0.89     
Fluid 
Instantaneous Releases Constants 
Auto-Ignition Not Likely Auto-Ignition Likely 
(IAINL) (IAIL) 
Gas Liquid Gas Liquid 
a b a B A b a B 
C₁-C₂ 6.469 0.67     163.7 0.62     
C₃-C₄ 4.590 0.72     79.94 0.63     
C₅ 2.214 0.72 0.271 0.85 41.38 0.61     
C₆-C₈ 2.188 0.66 0.749 0.78 41.49 0.61 8.180 0.55 
C₉-C₁₂ 1.111 0.66 0.559 0.76 42.28 0.61 0.848 0.53 
C₁₃-C₁₆     0.086 0.88     1.714 0.88 
C₁₇-C₂₅     0.021 0.91     1.068 0.91 
C₂₅₊     0.006 0.99     0.284 0.99 
H₂ 9.605 0.657     216.5 0.618     
H₂S 22.63 0.63     53.72 0.61     
 
e) For each release hole size, compute the component damage 
consequence areas for Autoignition Likely, Continuous 
Release (AIL-CONT), (𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇) 
1) Determine the appropriate constants, a (𝑎𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇) and b 
(𝑏𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇) The release phase as determined in step 
2.2.1.3.2.1.1.d will be needed to assure selection of the correct 
constants. 
2) If the release type is gas or vapor, Type 0 or Type 1, then use 
Equation (2.29) to compute the consequence area and 
Equation (2.30) to compute the effective release rate. 
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𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 𝑎(𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛)
𝑏 x (1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡) 2.29 
 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛 2.30 
 
f) For each release hole size, compute the component damage 
consequence areas for Autoignition Not Likely, Instantaneous 
Release (AINL-INST) 
1) Determine the appropriate constants a (𝑎𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇) and b 
(𝑏𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇). The release phase as determined in step 
2.2.1.3.2.1.1.d will be needed to assure selection of the correct 
constants. 
2) If the release is a gas or vapor and the fluid type is TYPE 0, or 
the fluid type is TYPE 1, then use equation (2.31) for the 
consequence area and equation (2.32) for the effective release 
rate. 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 𝑎(𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑛)
𝑏 x (
1−𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑛
) 2.31 
 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑛 2.32 
 
g) For each release hole size, compute the component damage 
consequence areas for Autoignition Likely, Instantaneous 
Release (AIL-INST) (𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇) 
1) Determine the appropriate constants a (𝑎𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇) and b 
(𝑏𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇). The release phase as determined in step 
2.2.1.3.2.1.1.d will be needed to assure selection of the correct 
constants. 
2) If the release type is gas or vapor, Type 0 or Type 1, then use 
Equation (2.31) to compute the consequence area and 
Equation (2.32) to compute the effective release rate. 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 𝑎(𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑛)
𝑏 x (
1−𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑛
) 2.33 
 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑛 2.34 
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h) For each release hole size, compute the personnel injury 
consequence areas for Auto-ignition Not Likely, Continuous 
Release (AINL-CONT) (𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇) 
1) Determine the appropriate constants a (𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇) and b 
(𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇). The release phase as determined in step 
2.2.1.3.2.1.1.d will be needed to assure selection of the correct 
constants. 
2) Compute the consequence area using Equation (2.35) where 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 is from step 2.2.1.3.2.1.8.d. 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 𝑎(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇)𝑏 x (1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡) 2.35 
 
i) For each release hole size, compute the personnel injury 
consequence areas for Auto-ignition Likely, Continuous 
Release (AIL-CONT) (𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇) 
1) Determine the appropriate constants a (𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇) and b 
(𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇). The release phase as determined in step 
2.2.1.3.2.1.1.d will be needed to assure selection of the correct 
constants. 
2) Compute the consequence area using Equation (2.36) where 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 is from step 2.2.1.3.2.1.8.e. 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 𝑎(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇)𝑏 x (1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡) 2.36 
 
j) For each release hole size, compute the personnel injury 
consequence areas for Auto-ignition Not Likely, Instantaneous 
Release (AINL-INST) (𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇) 
1) Determine the appropriate constants a (𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇) and b 
(𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇). The release phase as determined in step 
2.2.1.3.2.1.1.d will be needed to assure selection of the correct 
constants. 
2) Compute the consequence area using equation (2.36) where 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 is from step 2.2.1.3.2.1.1.f. 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 𝑎(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇)𝑏 x (
1−𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑛
) 2.36 
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k) For each release hole size, compute the personnel injury 
consequence areas for Auto-ignition Likely, Instantaneous 
Release (AIL-INST) (𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇) 
1) Determine the appropriate constants a (𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇) and b 
(𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇). The release phase as determined in step 
2.2.1.3.2.1.1.d will be needed to assure selection of the correct 
constants. 
2) Compute the consequence area using equation (2.37) where 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 is from step 2.2.1.3.2.1.1.g. 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 𝑎(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇)𝑏 x (
1−𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑛
) 2.37 
 
l) For each release hole size, calculate the 
instantaneous/continuous blending factor (𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶). 
1) For Continuous Releases – To smooth out the results for 
releases that are near the continuous to instantaneous 
transition point (4,536 kgs [10,000 lbs] in 3 minutes, or a 
release rate of 25.2 kg/s [55.6 lb/s]), then the blending factor 
use equation (2.38). 
 
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶= min[{
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐶5
} ,  1.0] 2.38 
 
2) For Instantaneous Releases – Blending is not required. Since 
the definition of an instantaneous release is one with a 
adjusted release rate (raten) greater than 25.2 kg/s [55.6 lb/s] 
(4536 kg [10,000 lbs] in 3 minutes), then the blending factor 
use equation (2.39). 
 
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶= 1.0 2.39 
 
m) Calculate the AIT blending factor (𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐴𝐼𝑇), using some 
equations, as applicable. Since Ts (450.15 kelvin) + C₆ (56) < 
AIT (831.150) then the equation: 
 
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐴𝐼𝑇 = 0 2.40 
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n) Compute the continuous/instantaneous blended 
consequence areas for the component using equations (2.41) 
through (2.48). 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿 = 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶 +  𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 𝑥 (1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶  )
 2.41 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿 = 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶 +  𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 𝑥 (1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶 )
 2.42 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 = 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶 +  𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 𝑥 (1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶)
 2.43 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 = 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶 +  𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 𝑥 (1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶)
 2.44 
 
o) Compute the AIT blended consequence areas for the 
component using equations (2.45) and (2.46). The resulting 
consequence areas are the component damage and personnel 
injury flammable consequence areas. 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚
= 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐴𝐼𝑇 +  𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿  𝑥 (1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐴𝐼𝑇 ) 2.45 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚
= 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐴𝐼𝑇 +  𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 𝑥 (1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐴𝐼𝑇 ) 2.46 
 
p) STEP 8.16 – Determine the final consequence areas 
(probability weighted on release hole size) for component 
damage and personnel injury using equations (2.47) and 
(2.48). 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚
 = (
∑ 𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑛 𝑥 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚4
𝑛=1
𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
) 2.47 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚
 = (
∑ 𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑛 𝑥 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚4
𝑛=1
𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
) 2.48 
 
2.2.1.3.2.2. Level 2 Consequence Analysis 
The Level 2 consequence analysis may be used in cases where the 
assumptions of the Level 1 consequence analysis are not valid. 
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Examples of where the more rigorous calculations may be necessary 
are cited below. 
a) The specific fluid is not represented adequately within the list of 
reference fluid groups provided in the Level 1 analysis, including 
cases where the fluid is a wide-range boiling mixture or where 
the fluids toxic consequences are not represented adequately by 
any of the reference fluid groups. 
b) The stored fluid is close to its critical point, in which case, the 
ideal gas assumptions for the vapor release equations are 
invalid. 
c) The effects of two-phase releases, including liquid jet 
entrainment as well as rainout need to be included in the 
assessment. 
d) The effects of BLEVES are to be included in the assessment (not 
included in the Level 1 analysis). 
e) The effects of pressurized non-flammable explosions, such as 
possible when non-flammable pressurized gases (e.g. air or 
nitrogen) are released during a vessel rupture are to be included 
in the assessment (not included in the Level 1 analysis). 
f) The meteorological assumptions used in the dispersion 
calculations that form the basis for the Level 1 consequence 
analysis table lookups do not represent the site data. 
 
2.2.1.4. Remaining Lifetime Analysis 
The remaining lifetime of the equipment is the time for which the 
existing equipment can continue to operate before it has to be 
replaced/discarded for technical reasons, such as the age of the 
equipment, safety reasons, or deteriorated performance. The remaining 
lifetime is expressed in years or hours of operation. The calculation to 
analyze can be generate by equation (2.49). 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 =  
𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡− 𝑡𝑟𝑑
𝐶𝑅
 2.49 
 
Where: 
Tact = wall thickness when inspection 
trd = design wall thickness  
CR = Corrosion rate 
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Figure 3.1 Bachelor thesis methodology 
CHAPTER 3 
 METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The following methodology flowchart shows the process diagram of bachelor 
thesis. 
START
Risk Based Inspection:
1. API 581
2. API 580
3.  Textbook
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asset to determine
criteria of damage 
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Overview the 
problem
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failure frequency
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Amount of fluid 
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Theoretical 
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Assess the Impact 
of Deflection and 
Isolation System
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Release Rate and 
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Probability-Weighed 
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A
Calculate 
Flamable 
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Calculate the 
Remaining lifetime 
Analysis
Determine  
Inspection 
Planning
Finish
A
 
Figure 3.1 Bachelor thesis methodology (Continue) 
 
3.1. Literatures Study 
Literatures of bachelor thesis study is started with reading and analyze the 
rules in this case is American Petroleum Institute (API), the bachelor thesis 
uses API 580 for risk based inspection, API 581 for risk based inspection 
technology and API 579 to determine fitness for service of the asset. 
 
Besides API, author also uses textbook and journal to analyze RBI. The 
textbooks are around offshore oil and gas platform and maritime sector. 
Then, author also needs journal to determine the procedure of RBI 
according to the previous occurrence.  
 
3.2. Determine Generic Failure Frequency 
Generic failure frequency is starting from determining what type of asset 
we have. Then starting to determine the generic failure frequency from the 
table. 
 
3.3. Determining Damage Mechanism 
The first step to identify damage mechanism is prepare for the data. Then, 
according to the data the kind of damage mechanism can be identified and 
for the step and the calculation can be obtained in the RBI 581. 
 
3.4. Final Damage Factor Calculation 
Final damage factor calculation can be calculated if the damage mechanism 
has already determined. Then calculate the final damage factor using RBI 
58. After that, the result is ready to use for calculating probability of failure.
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CHAPTER 4  
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 
4.1. Collecting Asset Data 
The first step is learning about the asset working process in figure (4.1). The 
asset (Gas-cooling heat exchanger) is incorporated with offshore used to 
gas lift to lift crude oil. The flow station compression system at flow station 
is completed with two stage compressor, scrubber and coolers. Combined 
gas from gas wells supply to 1st Stage Suction Scrubber and then 
compressed by 1st Stage Compressor. Increasing gas pressure will increase 
gas temperature. Therefore, the gas should be cooling down by cooler 
before feed into 2nd Stage Compression system. In the 2nd Stage 
Compression System, gas will be compressed with the same process 
described above. The final compressed gas then mainly used as gas lift to 
lift crude oil. The specific location of the asset (Gas-cooling heat exchanger) 
is in the 2nd stage compression system. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Simplified compression diagram 
 
Then, next step is collecting asset data. There are 2 kinds of data are needed 
in the RBI. The first is asset specification data (table 4.1) and previous 
inspection report. The specification data (table 4.1) must be qualified 
because RBI needs the actual and comprehensive data to obtain the perfect 
goal. And don’t forget to notice the accident of the asset for the example 
the asset has a history of down by chloride stress corrosion cracking (cl-scc) 
so cl-scc must be input to the damage factor. 
 
Table 4.1 Asset specification data 
Year Installed 2012 
Last inspection 2013 
Design pressure  6205.28 kPa 
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Table 4.1 Asset specification data (Continue) 
Tube material Seamless SS A 316L 
Header box material SS SA 240 TP 316L 
Corrosion allowance (tubes) (mm) 1.99 
Corrosion allowance (header box) (mm) 1.27 
Corrosion rate (mm/year) 0.023 
Tube diameter (inch) 1 
Inlet pressure (psig) 710 
Inlet temperature (ºF) 238 
Outlet pressure (psig) 690 
Outlet temperature (ºF) 107 
Design capacity (MMScfd) 25 
Current flow rate (MMScfd) 18 
Inlet pressure (psig) 710 
Inlet temperature (ºF) 238 
Outlet pressure (psig) 690 
Outlet temperature (ºF) 107 
Molecular weight (J/kmol.K) 25 
Universal gas constant (J/(kg.mol)K 8.314 
Auto ignition temperature (°C) 558 
Steady state phase Gas 
Phase of the fluid stored in equipment Gas 
 
4.2. Generic Failure Frequency (gff) 
Determine generic failure frequency is the first part to calculate probability 
of failure Generic failure frequency table is provided in table 2.1. The result 
of generic failure frequency in for the tube and for the header box is 3.06 x 
10-5 and the answer is shown by the table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 Determine the generic failure frequency from table. 
Equipment 
type 
Component 
type 
gff as a Function of Hole Size (failures/yr) gff(total) 
(failures/yr) Small Medium Small Medium 
Pipe PIPE-1 2.80E-05 0 0 2.60E-06 3.06E-05 
Vessel/ FinFan FINFAN 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05 
 
4.3. Damage Mechanism Identification 
Generating damage mechanism identification started from screening few 
criteria of damage mechanism; the first one is material composition of the 
asset, fluid data in the asset, environment around the asset, and other 
factors which is related to the damage mechanism. According to the asset 
data and identify damage mechanism with table (4.3) there are two type of 
damage factor chosen. The first is thinning damage factor and the second 
is CL-SCC damage factor. 
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Table 4.3 damage mechanism identification 
No. 
Type Damage 
Mechanism 
Criteria based on API 581 Yes/No Result 
1 
Thinning 
Damage factor 
In an API RBI assessment, all components should 
be checked for thinning. Yes Yes 
2 
Component 
Lining Damage 
Factor 
The component has an inorganic or organic 
lining, then the component should be evaluated 
for lining damage. 
No No 
3 
SCC Damage 
Factor - 
Caustic 
Cracking 
The component’s material of construction is 
carbon or low alloy steel 
Yes 
No 
The process environment contains caustic in any 
concentration 
No 
4 
SCC Damage 
Factor - Amine 
Cracking 
The component’s material of construction is 
carbon or low alloy steel 
Yes 
No 
The process environment contains acid gas 
treating amines (MEA, DEA, DIPA, MDEA, etc.) in 
any concentration. 
No 
5 
SCC Damag 
Factor - Sulfide 
Stress Cracking 
The component’s material of construction is 
carbon or low alloy steel 
Yes 
No 
The process environment contains water and 
H2S in any concentration 
No 
6 
SCC Damage 
Factor - 
HIC/SOHIC-
H2S 
If the component’s material of construction is 
carbon or low alloy steel 
Yes 
No 
the process environment contains water and 
H2S in any concentration 
No 
7 
SCC Damage 
Factor - 
Carbonate 
Cracking 
If the component’s material of construction is 
carbon or low alloy steel 
Yes 
No 
the process environment contains sour water at 
pH > 7.5 in any concentration 
No 
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Table 4.3 damage mechanism identification (Continue) 
No. 
Type Damage 
Mechanism 
Criteria based on API 581 Yes/No Result 
8 
SCC Damage 
Factor - PTA 
Cracking 
If the component’s material of construction is an 
austenitic stainless steel or nickel based alloys 
No 
No 
The component is exposed to sulfur bearing 
compounds 
No 
9 
SCC Damage 
Factor - CLSCC 
The component’s material of construction is an 
austenitic stainless steel 
Yes 
Yes 
The component is exposed or potentially 
exposed to chlorides and water also considering 
upsets and hydrotest water remaining in 
component, and cooling tower drift (consider 
both under insulation and process conditions) 
Yes 
The operating temperature is above 38°C [100°F] Yes 
10 
SCC Damage 
Factor - HSC-
HF 
If the component’s material of construction is 
carbon or low alloy steel 
Yes 
No 
the component is exposed to hydrofluoric acid 
in any concentration 
No 
11 
SCC Damage 
Factor - 
HIC/SOHIC-HF 
If the component’s material of construction is 
carbon or low alloy steel 
Yes 
No 
the component is exposed to hydrofluoric acid 
in any concentration 
No 
 
4.3.1. Calculation of Thinning Damage Factor 
Determining the number of inspections is the first step to calculate the 
thinning damage factor, and the corresponding inspection effectiveness 
category using table (4.4) and table (4.5) for general thinning and local 
thinning. Combine the inspections to the highest effectiveness performed 
using paragraph 2.2.1.2.2. Then, obtained three answers; number of 
inspection = 1 (on October 2013); Inspection category = A (highly 
effectiveness) for the tube and C (fairly effectiveness) for the header box.  
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Table 4.4 Guidelines for Assigning Inspection Effectiveness – General Thinning 
Inspection 
Category 
Inspection 
Effectiveness 
Category 
Intrusive Inspection 
Example 
Non-intrusive Inspection 
Example 
A Highly Effective 
50 to 100% examination 
of the surface (partial 
internals removed), and 
accompanied by 
thickness measurements 
50 to 100% ultrasonic 
scanning coverage 
(automated or manual) or 
profile radiography 
B Usually Effective 
Nominally 20% 
examination (no internals 
removed), and spot 
external ultrasonic 
thickness measurements 
Nominally 20% ultrasonic 
scanning coverage 
(automated or manual), or 
profile radiography, or 
external spot thickness 
(statistically validated) 
C Fairly Effective 
Visual examination with 
thickness measurements 
2 to 3% examination, spot 
external ultrasonic thickness 
measurements, and little or 
no internal visual 
examination 
D Poorly Effective Visual examination 
Several thickness 
measurements, and a 
documented inspection 
planning system 
E Ineffective No Inspection 
Several thickness 
measurements taken only 
externally, and a poorly 
documented inspection 
planning system 
 
Table 4.5 Guidelines for Assigning Inspection Effectiveness – Local Thinning 
Inspection 
Category 
Inspection 
Effectiveness 
Category 
Intusive Inspection 
Example 
Non-intrusive 
Inspection Example 
A Highly Effective 
100% visual 
examination (with 
removal of internal 
packing, trays, etc.) and 
thickness 
measurements 
50 to 100% coverage 
using automated 
ultrasonic scanning, or 
profile radiography in 
areas specified by a 
corrosion engineer or 
other knowledgeable 
specialist. 
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Table 4.5 Guidelines for Assigning Inspection Effectiveness – Local Thinning 
(Continue) 
B Usually Effective 
100% visual 
examination (with 
partial removal of the 
internals) including 
manways, nozzles, etc. 
and thickness 
measurements. 
20% coverage using 
automated ultrasonic 
scanning, or 50% manual 
ultrasonic scanning, or 
50% profile radiography 
in areas specified by a 
corrosion engineer or 
other knowledgeable 
specialist. 
C Fairly Effective 
Nominally 50% visual 
examination and spot 
ultrasonic thickness 
measurements 
Nominally 20% coverage 
using automated or 
manual ultrasonic 
scanning, or profile 
radiography, and spot 
thickness measurements 
at areas specified by a 
corrosion engineer or 
other knowledgeable 
specialist. 
D Poorly Effective 
Nominally 20% visual 
examination and spot 
ultrasonic thickness 
measurements 
Spot ultrasonic thickness 
measurements or profile 
radiography without 
areas being specified by 
a corrosion engineer or 
other knowledgeable 
specialist. 
E Ineffective No Inspection 
Spot ultrasonic thickness 
measurements without 
areas being specified by 
a corrosion engineer or 
other knowledgeable 
specialist. 
 
Step two is to determine the time in-service (age), since the last inspection 
thickness reading, (𝑡𝑟𝑑). And the answer is one year. Then step three is to 
determine the corrosion rate for the base metal, (𝐶𝑟,𝑏𝑚), based on the 
material of construction and process environment, Where the component 
has cladding, a corrosion rate, (𝐶𝑟,𝑏𝑚), must also be obtained for the 
cladding. But this asset has no cladding and the Corrosion rate is 0.023 
mm/yr. 
 
Step 4 is to determine the minimum required wall thickness (𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛) per the 
original construction code or using API 579 for the tube then applicable 
minimum required wall thickness for the tube is 1.13 mm. And the the 
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header box has no release prevention barrier then the 𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛 is 0.1 in or 2.54 
mm. And the last step, determine the 𝐴𝑟𝑡 parameter using Equation (4.1) 
based on the age and from STEP 2, from STEP 3, from STEP 4 and the age 
required to corrode away the cladding. 
 
𝐴𝑟𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥[1 −
𝑡𝑟𝑑− 𝐶𝑟,𝑐𝑚 ∙ 𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛+𝐶𝐴
,  0.0] (4.1) 
 
Where:  
𝑡𝑟𝑑 = 1.65 mm, 𝐶𝑟 = 0.023 mm/yr, 𝐴𝑔𝑒 = 1 yr, 𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 1.13 mm (for tube), 
2.54 mm (for header box) & 𝐶𝐴 = 1.27 mm (for tube), 1.59 mm (for 
header box)4 
 
Then, from the equation (2.12) the 𝐴𝑟𝑡 for tube is known: 0.348 in RBI date 
and 0.444 in plan date, and 0 in RBI date and 0 in plan date. Then use 
table (2.13) and table 2.7 to determine basic damage factor. Table (4.4) 
shown the way to determine basic damage factor from 𝐴𝑟𝑡 value.  For the 
example 𝐴𝑟𝑡 of tube in RBI date is 0.348 then according to the table, 0.348 
is between 0.3 and 0.35 then use interpolation formula to determine basic 
damage factor then, the basic damage factor value for the tube in RBI 
date is 544.124. For the tube, basic damage factor in plan date is 831.799. 
And for the Header box basic damage factor is 1 in RBI date and plan 
date. 
 
Table 4.6 basic damage factor determining for tube in RBI date 
Art 
Inspection Effectiveness 
E 
1 Inspection 2 Inspections 3 Inspections 
D C B A D C B A D C B A 
0.02 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0.04 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0.06 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0.08 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0.10 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0.12 6 5 3 2 1 4 2 1 1 3 1 1 1 
0.14 20 17 10 6 1 13 6 1 1 10 3 1 1 
0.16 90 70 50 20 3 50 20 4 1 40 10 1 1 
0.18 250 200 130 70 7 170 70 10 1 130 35 3 1 
0.20 400 300 210 110 15 290 120 20 1 260 60 5 1 
0.25 520 450 290 150 20 350 170 30 2 240 80 6 1 
0.30 650 550 400 200 30 400 200 40 4 320 110 9 2 
0.35 750 650 550 300 80 600 300 80 10 540 150 20 5 
                                                 
4 Corrosion allowance based on ASME B31.3.  
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4.6 basic damage factor determining for tube in RBI date 
0.40 900 800 700 400 130 700 400 120 30 600 200 50 10 
0.45 1050 900 810 500 200 800 500 160 40 700 270 60 20 
0.50 1200 1100 970 600 270 1000 600 200 60 900 360 80 40 
0.55 1350 1200 1130 700 350 1100 750 300 100 1000 500 130 90 
0.60 1500 1400 1250 850 500 1300 900 400 230 1200 620 250 210 
 
4.3.2. Calculation of CL-SCC Damage Factor 
First step is to determine the number of inspections, and the 
corresponding inspection effectiveness category using chapter 2.2.1.2.6. 
For all past inspections. Combine the inspections to the highest 
effectiveness, obtained number of past inspection = 1; inspection 
category = C (for header box), A (for tube); Inspection effectiveness 
category = Fairly effectiveness (for header box), Highly effectives (for 
tube). Second step is to determine the time in-service, age, since the last 
Level A, B, C or D inspection was performed. Then the age obtained 3.75 
year (RBI date), 14 years (plan date). Next step is to determine the 
susceptibility for cracking using table 4.7, based on the operating 
temperature and concentration of the chloride ions. Since the cracking is 
known present in the asset then the susceptibility must be high. 
According to the inspection report and the asset specification data 
obtained the temperature is 41,67oC – 114,44oC; the chloride content is 
16000 ppm; and this asset is reported has already cracked on the October 
2013. Then the susceptibility to cracking of the asset is high for tube and 
header box in RBI date and plan date. 
 
Table 4.7 Susceptibility to Cracking – CLSCC 
pH ≤ 10 
Temperature 
(°C) 
Susceptibility to Cracking as a Function of Chloride ion (ppm) 
1-10  11-100 101-1000 >1000 
38 - 66 Low Medium Medium High 
>66 - 93 Medium Medium High High 
>93 - 149 Medium High High High 
 
Step four is to determine the severity index based on the susceptibility, 
𝑆𝑉𝐼 from Table 4.8 then obtained; 𝑆𝑉𝐼 = 5000 for tube and header box in 
RBI date and plan date. 
 
Table 4.8 Determination of Severity Index – CLSCC 
Susceptibility Severity Index – SVI 
High 5000 
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Step five is to determine the base damage factor for CLSCC, 𝐷𝑓𝑏
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶 using 
Table 4.9, and the highest inspection effectiveness determined in step 1, 
and the severity index, 𝑆𝑉𝐼, from step 4. 𝐷𝑓𝐵
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶 = 250 (for tube), 1670 (for 
header box). 
 
Table 4.9 Based SCC Damage Factors (red square is for the header box and blue 
square is for the tube) 
SVI 
Inspection Effectiveness 
E 
1 Inspection 2 Inspections 3 Inspections 
D C B A D C B A D C B A 
50 50 40 17 5 3 30 10 2 1 20 5 1 1 
100 100 80 33 10 5 60 20 4 1 40 10 2 1 
500 500 400 170 50 25 300 100 20 5 200 50 8 1 
1000 1000 800 330 100 50 600 200 40 10 400 100 16 2 
5000 5000 4000 1670 500 250 3000 1000 250 50 2000 500 80 10 
 
And the last step is to calculate the escalation in the damage factor based 
on the period in-service since the last inspection using the age from step 
2 and Equation (4.2). In this equation, it is assumed that the probability 
for cracking will increase with time since the last inspection as a result of 
increased exposure to upset conditions and other non-normal conditions. 
 
𝐷𝑓
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶 = 𝐷𝑓𝐵
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶 (age)1.1  (4.2) 
 
= 250 x 3.751.1 = 1070 (RBI date for tube) 
= 250 x 141.1 = 4557 (RBI plan date for tube) 
= 1670 x 3.751.1 = 7147.45 (RBI date for header box) 
= 1670 x 141.1 = 30440.9 (RBI plan date for header box) 
 
4.3.3. Total Damage Factor 
Total damage factor is the final damage factor calculation. In this 
calculation combine all damage factors which are obtained. 
 
Df−total = 𝐷𝑓
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 + 𝐷𝑓
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶 (4.3) 
 
= 2720.62 + 1070 = 3790.6 (RBI date) 
= 4158.99 + 4557 = 8716.01 (RBI plan date) 
= 7.5 + 7147.45 = 7154.95 (RBI date) 
= 7.5 +30440.9 = 30448.4 (RBI plan date) 
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4.4. Calculation of Consequence  
The consequence analysis in an RBI program is performed to provide 
discrimination between equipment items on the basis of the significance of 
a potential failure. The consequence analysis should be a repeatable, 
simplified, credible estimate of what might be expected to happen if a 
failure were to occur in the equipment item being assessed. The COF 
analysis should be performed to estimate the consequences that occur due 
to a failure mode typically resulting from an identified damage mechanism. 
 
In general, an RBI program will be managed by plant inspectors or 
inspection engineers, who will normally manage risk by managing the POF 
with inspection and maintenance planning. They will not normally have 
much ability to modify the COF. On the other hand, management and 
process safety personnel may desire to manage the consequence side of 
the risk equation. For all of these users, the consequence analysis is an aid 
in establishing a relative risk ranking of equipment items. The consequence 
analysis should address all credible failure modes to which the equipment 
item is susceptible. There are two kinds of consequences used in the thesis, 
they are consequences for the tube and consequences for the header box.  
 
4.4.1. Determining the Representative Fluid and Associated Properties 
In the Level 1 Consequence Analysis, a representative fluid that most 
closely matches the fluid contained in the pressurized system being 
evaluated is selected from the representative fluids shown in table 2.8 
Because very few refinery and chemical plant streams are pure materials, 
the selection of a representative fluid almost always involves making 
some assumptions. 
 
According to the chapter 2.2.1.3.2.1.1. the first step is selecting a 
representative fluid group from table 2.8. according to the company data 
the fluid is known as C1 then the fluid type is “TYPE 0”. Then the phase of 
fluid known as vapor and not change into liquid. After that, from the table 
2.9, the molecular weight is 23 kg/kg-mol. Then using the equation (2.15) 
the ideal gas specific ratio is 1.167 and the auto ignition temperature is 
558 oC. And for the steady phase of fluid is gas and the fluid in the storage 
is also gas. 
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4.4.2. Release Hole Size Selection 
A discrete set of release events or release hole sizes are used in the Level 
1 (and Level 2) consequence analysis. It would be impractical to perform 
the consequence calculations for a continuous spectrum of release hole 
sizes. Limiting the number of release hole sizes allows for an analysis that 
is manageable yet still reflects the range of possible outcomes. 
 
There are two kinds of determining release hole size diameter. For the 
tube, using small (6.4 mm) and rupture (155 mm) because in the table of 
generic failure frequency (gff)(table 2.1) frequency the tube is same as one 
inch pipe. For the header box, using small (6.4 mm), medium (25 mm), 
large (102 mm) and rupture (155 mm).  
 
4.4.3. Release Rate Calculation 
Release rates depend upon the physical properties of the material, the 
initial phase, the process operating conditions, and the assigned release 
hole sizes. The correct release rate equation must be chosen, based on 
the phase of the material when it is inside the equipment item, and its 
discharge regime (sonic or subsonic), as the material is released. 
 
The release hole size area for tube and for header box of heat exchanger 
are shown in the table (4.10). 
 
Table 4.10 Summary of release hole size area 
Header box Tube 
A₁ 32.18285714 mm2 A₁ 32.18285714 mm2 
A₂ 491.0714286 mm2 A₄ 18876.78571 mm2 
A₃ 8174.571429 mm2   
A₄ 18876.8 mm2   
 
The summaries of calculation of release rate shown in the table (4.11). 
 
Table 4.11 Summary of release hole size area 
Header box Tube 
W₁ 9.535346584 kg/s W₁ 9.535346584 kg/s 
W₂ 145.4978422 kg/s W₂ 5592.937052kg/s 
W₃ 2422.01528 kg/s   
W₄ 5592.937052 kg/s   
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4.4.4. Estimate the Fluid Inventory Available for Release (Available Mass) 
The consequence calculation requires an upper-limit for the amount of 
fluid, or fluid inventory that is available for release from an equipment 
item. In theory, the total amount of fluid that can be released is the 
amount that is held within pressure containing equipment between 
isolation valves that can be quickly closed. In reality, emergency 
operations can be performed over time to close manual valves, de-
inventory sections, or otherwise stop a leak. In addition, piping restrictions 
and differences in elevation can serve to effectively slow or stop a leak. 
The inventory calculation as presented here is used as an upper limit and 
does not indicate that this amount of fluid would be released in all leak 
scenarios. 
 
First step to calculate available mass is group component items into 
inventory groups using table 2.12 then the inventory group is Finfan 
cooler & finfan then for header box and pipe-1 for the tube, the masscomp 
is 0.009112178 kgs for the header box and 0.054284 kgs for the tube then 
because the header box only two so the mass inventory is 6.24266 kgs 
and 4472.582 for the tube because the tube is 115 items. Then calculate 
flow rate from 203 mm diameter hole (Wmax8) and get 9614.49741 kgs for 
the tube and header box. Next step, calculate the Added fluid mass 
(massadd,n) and the summaries of fluid mass calculation for header box and 
for tube shown in the table 4.12 
 
Table 4.12 Summary of fluid mass calculation (massadd,n) 
Header box Tube 
massadd,₁ 1716.362385 kgs massadd,₁ 1716.362385 kgs 
massadd,₂ 26189.61159 kgs massadd,₄ 1006728.669 kgs 
massadd,₃ 435962.7503 kgs   
massadd,₄ 1006728.669 kgs   
 
Then for the available mass for release (massavail,n) 
 
Table 4.13 Summary of available mass for release (massavail,n) 
Header box Tube 
massavail,₁  0.018224357 kgs
 massavail,₁ 6.24266 kgs 
massavail,₂  0.018224357 kgs massavail,₄ 6.24266 kgs 
massavail,₃  0.018224357 kgs   
massavail,₄  0.018224357 kgs   
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4.4.5. Determining the Release Type (Continuous or Instantaneous) 
Different analytical models and methods are used to estimate the effects 
of an instantaneous versus a continuous type of release. The calculated 
consequences can differ greatly, depending on the type of analytical 
model chosen to represent the release. Therefore, it is very important that 
a release is properly categorized into one of the two release types. 
 
As an example of the importance of proper model selection is the case 
for vapor cloud explosions, VCEs. A review of historical data on fires and 
explosions shows that unconfined vapor cloud explosions are more likely 
to occur for instantaneous vapor releases than they are for continuous 
releases. For API RBI a threshold for the instantaneous release model is if 
more than 4,536 kilograms [10,000 pounds] of fluid are released in a short 
period of time. Using this threshold to define continuous releases reflects 
the tendency for amounts released in a short period of time, less than 
4,536 kilograms [10,000 pounds], to result in a flash fire rather than a VCE. 
 
The summaries of time required to release and release type shown in table 
(4.14) for header box and table (4.15) for tube. 
 
Table 4.14 time required to release and release type (Header Box) 
d₁ = 6.4 mm massavail,1 = 0.018224 mm t₁ = 475.7037 second Continuous  
d₂ = 25 mm massavail,2 = 0.018224 mm t₂ = 31.1757 second Instantaneous  
d₃ = 102 mm massavail,3 = 0.018224 mm t₃ = 1.8728 second Instantaneous 
d₄ = 155 mm massavail,4 = 0.018224 mm t₄ = 0.8110 second Instantaneous 
 
Table 4.15 time required to release and release type (Tube) 
d₁ = 6.4 mm massavail,1 = 6.243 mm t₁ = 475.7037 second Continuous  
d₄ = 155 mm massavail,4 = 6.243 mm t₄ = 0.8110 second Instantaneous 
 
4.4.6. Estimate the Impact of Detection and Isolation Systems on Release 
Magnitude 
Petrochemical processing plants typically have a variety of detection, 
isolation and mitigation systems that are designed to reduce the effects 
of a release of hazardous materials. A simplified methodology for 
assessing the effectiveness of various types of detection, isolation and 
mitigation systems is included in API RBI. These systems affect a release 
in different ways. Some systems reduce magnitude and duration of the 
release by detecting and isolating the leak. Other systems reduce the 
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consequence area by minimizing the chances for ignition or limiting the 
spread of material. 
 
To generated impact of detection and isolation system on release 
magnitude, use table (2.13) to classify detection and isolation and the 
result of detection system is A and isolation system is B for header box 
and tube. Then use table (2.14) to determine reduction factor (factdi) and 
the reduction factor is 0,2 for header box and tube. Then for the total leak 
duration for each of the release hole sizes selection shown in table (4.16). 
 
Table 4.16 total leak duration for each of the release hole sizes selection 
Header box Tube 
Idmax,₁ 30 minutes for 6.4 mm leaks
 Idmax,₁ 30 minutes for 6.4 mm leaks 
Idmax,₂ 20 minutes for 25 mm leaks Idmax,₄ 0.0167 minutes for 155 mm leaks 
Idmax,₃ 10 minutes for 102 mm leaks   
Idmax,₄ 0.0167 minutes for 155 mm leaks   
 
4.4.7. Determine the Release Rate and Mass for Consequence Analysis 
For continuous releases, the release is modeled as a steady state plume; 
therefore, the release rate (kg/s) is used as the input to the consequence 
analysis. For transient instantaneous puff releases, the release mass is 
required to perform the analysis. 
 
According to the chapter 2.2.1.3.2.1.7. the result of the release rate and 
mass for consequences analysis shown in table (4.17) for header box and 
table (4.18) for tube. 
 
Table 4.17 release rate and mass for consequences analysis results 
rate₁ = 7.628277267 kg/s Id1 = 0.002389053 s mass₁ = 0.01822 kgs 
rate₂ = 116.3982737 kg/s Id,2 = 0.000156569 s mass₂ = 0.01822 kgs 
rate₃ = 1937.612224 kg/s Id3 = 9.40557E-06 s mass₃ = 0.01822 kgs 
rate₄ = 4474.349642 kg/s Id4 = 4.07307E-06 s mass₄ = 0.01822 kgs 
 
Table 4.18 release rate and mass for consequences analysis results 
rate₁ = 7.628277267 kg/s Id1 = 0.818357774 s mass₁ = 6.24266 kgs 
rate₄ = 4474.349642 kg/s Id4 = 0.001395211 s mass₄ = 6.24266 kgs 
 
4.4.8. Determine Flammable and Explosive Consequence 
Determining flammable and explosive consequence is the last calculation 
for consequences and first step is determining reduction factor (factmit) 
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and according to table (2.16) the result for header box and tube is 0.2. 
Then the second step is calculating energy efficiency correction factor 
(eneffn) for instantaneous release (determining continuous and 
instantaneous release generated in chapter 4.4.5) and the result shown in 
table 4.19 for header box and 4.20 for tube. 
 
Table 4.19 energy efficiency correction factor (Header box) 
t₁ = 475.7037 second Continuous  eneff,₁ N/A 
t₂ = 31.1757 second Continuous  eneff,₂ -20.5838 
t₃ = 1.8728 second Instantaneous eneff,₃  -20.5838 
t₄ = 0.8110 second Instantaneous eneff,₄ -20.5838 
 
Table 4.20 energy efficiency correction factor (Header box) 
t₁ = 475.7037 second Continuous  eneff,₁ N/A 
t₄ = 0.8110 second Instantaneous eneff,₄ -10.445 
 
Then the before we got flammable and explosive consequences we must 
calculate the component damage consequence areas for autoignition not 
likely, continuous release (AINL-CONT) (𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇), component 
damage consequence areas for autoignition likely, continuous release 
(AIL-CONT) (𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇), component damage consequence areas for 
autoignition not likely, instantaneous release (AINL-INST) (𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇), 
component damage consequence areas for autoignition likely, 
instantaneous release (AIL-INST) (𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇), personnel injury 
consequence areas for autoignition not likely, continuous release (AINL-
CONT) (𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇), personnel injury consequence areas for 
autoignition likely, continuous release (AIL-CONT) (𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇), 
personnel injury consequence areas for autoignition not likely, 
instantaneous release (AINL-INST) (𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇), personnel injury 
consequence areas for autoignition likely, instantaneous release (AIL-
INST) (𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇). Then the summaries of those results shown in table 
4.21 (for header box and tube). 
 
Table 4.21 Summaries of calculation consequence results (1) 
 Header Box Tube 
𝑪𝑨𝒄𝒎𝒅,𝒏
𝑨𝑰𝑵𝑳−𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,1
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 50.7969 m2 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,1
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 50.7969 m2 
𝑪𝑨𝒄𝒎𝒅,𝒏
𝑨𝑰𝑳−𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,1
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 303.937 m2 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,1
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 303.937 m2 
𝑪𝑨𝒄𝒎𝒅,𝒏
𝑨𝑰𝑵𝑳−𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑻 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,2
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= -0.01718 m2 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= -1.69013 m2 
 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,3
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= -0.01718 m2   
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Table 4.21 Summaries of calculation results (1) (continue) 
 Header Box Tube 
 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= -0.01718 m2   
𝑪𝑨𝒄𝒎𝒅,𝒏
𝑨𝑰𝑳−𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑻 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,2
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= -0.53115 m2 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= -39.0269 m2 
 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,3
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= -0.53115 m2   
 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇=  -0.53115 m2   
𝑪𝑨𝒊𝒏𝒋,𝒏
𝑨𝑰𝑵𝑳−𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,1
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 122.821 m2 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,1
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 122.821 m2 
𝑪𝑨𝒊𝒏𝒋,𝒏
𝑨𝑰𝑳−𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,1
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 742.789 m2 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,1
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇=  742.788 m2 
𝑪𝑨𝒊𝒏𝒋,𝒏
𝑨𝑰𝑵𝑳−𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑻 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,2
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 -0.03309 m2 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= -3.25538 m2 
 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,3
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 -0.03309 m2   
 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 -0.03309 m2   
𝑪𝑨𝒊𝒏𝒋,𝒏
𝑨𝑰𝑳−𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑻 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,2
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= -1.47728 m2 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,4
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= -115.068 m2 
 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,3
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= -1.47728 m2   
 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,4
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= -1.47728 m2   
 
Then calculate the instantaneous/continuous AIT Blending Factor (𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛𝐼𝐶) 
and AIT blending factor (𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐴𝐼𝑇). After that, calculate continuous/ 
instantaneous blended consequence areas and calculate AIT blended 
consequence areas. The summaries of the result of these equations shown 
in table 4.22. 
 
Table 4.22 Summaries of calculation consequence results (2) 
 Header Box Tube 
𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒏
𝑰𝑪 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡1
𝐼𝐶= 0.302709415 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡1
𝐼𝐶= 0.302709415 
 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡2
𝐼𝐶= 1 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡4
𝐼𝐶= 1  
 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡3
𝐼𝐶= 1   
 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡4
𝐼𝐶= 1   
𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝑨𝑰𝑻 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐴𝐼𝑇= 0 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐴𝐼𝑇 0  
𝑪𝑨𝒄𝒎𝒅,𝒏
𝑨𝑰𝑳  𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,1
𝐴𝐼𝐿 = 92.0045 m2 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,1
𝐴𝐼𝐿 = 92.0045 m2 
 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,2
𝐴𝐼𝐿 = 0 m2 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝐴𝐼𝐿 = 0 m2 
 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,3
𝐴𝐼𝐿 = 0 m2   
 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝐴𝐼𝐿 = 0 m2   
𝑪𝑨𝒊𝒏𝒋,𝒏
𝑨𝑰𝑳  𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,1
𝐴𝐼𝐿 = 224.8492 m2 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,1
𝐴𝐼𝐿 = 224.849 m2 
 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,2
𝐴𝐼𝐿 = 0 m2 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,4
𝐴𝐼𝐿 = -15.0683 m2 
 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,3
𝐴𝐼𝐿 = 0 m2   
 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,4
𝐴𝐼𝐿 = 0 m2   
𝑪𝑨𝒄𝒎𝒅,𝒏
𝑨𝑰𝑵𝑳  𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,1
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 = 15.3767 m2 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,1
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 = 15.3767 m2 
 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,2
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 = 0 m2 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 = 0 m2 
 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,3
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 = 0 m2   
 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 = 0 m2   
𝑪𝑨𝒊𝒏𝒋,𝒏
𝑨𝑰𝑵𝑳 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,1
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 = 37.1791 m2 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,1
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 = 37.1791 m2 
 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,2
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 = 0 m2 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,4
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 = 0 m2 
 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,3
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 = 0 m2   
 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,4
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 = 0 m2   
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Table 4.22 Summaries of calculation consequence results (2) 
 Header Box Tube 
𝑪𝑨𝒄𝒎𝒅,𝒏
𝒇𝒍𝒂𝒎
 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,1
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚
= 15.3767 m2 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,1
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚
= 15.3767 m2 
 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,2
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚
= 0 m2 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 = 0 m2 
 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,3
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 = 0 m2   
 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 = 0 m2   
𝑪𝑨𝒊𝒏𝒋,𝒏
𝒇𝒍𝒂𝒎
 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,1
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 = 37.2 m2 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,1
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 = 37.1791 m2 
 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,2
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 = 0 m2 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,4
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 = 0 m2 
 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,3
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 = 0 m2   
 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,4
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 = 0 m2   
 
For the calculation of final consequence areas for component damage 
and personal injury as shown in the equation (2.47) and (2.48) then the 
result is 4 m2 for component damage and 9.7 m2 for personnel injury for 
the header box and 14.1 m2 for component damage and 34.0 m2 for 
personnel injury for the tube. 
 
4.5. Risk determining 
According to the equation 2.1 the results of the risk calculation for the 
header box is 1.064 m²/year for the RBI date and 4.528 m²/year for the 
plan date. For the tube is 1.973 m²/year for the RBI date and 4.537 m²/year 
for the plan date.  
 
4.6. Inspection Planning 
For the first step to determine the inspection planning is calculate the 
target inspection date based on table 4.23 and diagram in the figure 4.2 
for the tube. And table 4.24 and diagram in figure 4.3 for the header box. 
 
Table 4.23 determining target inspection date table (tube) 
 Date Age Risk 
RBI Date 07/17/2017 3.75 1.973035017 
Risk Target 12/20/2019 10.71903108 3.71612 
Plan Date 07/17/2027 14 4.536751674 
Table 4.24 determining target inspection date table (Header box) 
 Date Age Risk 
RBI Date 07/17/2017 3.75 1.064058236 
Risk Target 07/06/2025 11.59720107 3.71612 
Plan Date 07/17/2027 14 4.528176567 
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Figure 4.2 Target inspection date diagram (Header Box) 
 
  
Figure 4.3 Target inspection date diagram (tube) 
 
4.7. Determine New Thinning and CL-SCC New Damage Factor 
Before determine the new damage factor the first step is proposed 
inspection into the better inspection effectiveness. Then for the tube, new 
inspection effectiveness is 3A for the thinning inspection and 2A for the 
CL-SCC inspection. Then the new damage factor obtained 191.5 for the 
thinning and 370.4 for the CL-SCC for the tube. And the total damage 
factor for the tube is 561.906.  
 
Then for the header box, new inspection effectiveness is 1.25A for the 
thinning inspection and 1A for the CL-SCC inspection. Then the new 
damage factor obtained 76.9665 for the thinning and 3705 for the CL-
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SCC for the header box. And the total damage factor for the header box 
is 3782.44. 
 
4.8. Determine the risk at plan date with inspection 
The result of the new risk at plan date for the tube is shown at summaries 
below. 
 
- Fms = 50% 
- Gff Total = 0.000036 
- POF with inspection = 0.0086 Failure/year 
- COF with inspection = 34.02 m2 
- Risk area with inspection = 0.29248 m2/year 
 
The result of the new risk at plan date for the header box is shown at 
summaries below. 
 
- Fms = 50% 
- Gff Total = 0.000036 
- POF with inspection = 0.05787 Failure/year 
- COF with inspection = 9.72 m2 
- Risk area with inspection = 0.56251 m2/year  
 
4.9. Remaining Lifetime Analysis 
Using the equation (2.49) then, the result of remaining lifetime analysis is: 
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 =  
1.85 − 1.65
0.023
 = 8. 696 years 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
5.1. Conclusion 
According to the analysis of the research study, then some conclusion 
could be taken as explain below: 
1. There are two damage factors obtained for the tube and header box. 
They are; thinning damage factor and CL-SCC damage factor and the 
result of the damage factor for the header box is 7154.95 at RBI date 
and 30448.4 at plan date. For the tube, the damage factor is 2720.62 
at RBI date and 4158.99 at the plan date. 
2. The risk area value for the tubes in the new inspection plan is 0.29248 
m2/year and for the header box the new inspection plan is 0.56251 
m2/year. 
3. The inspection planning for the tubes could be generated on July 6, 
2024 and inspection planning for the header box could be generated 
on July 6, 2025. 
4. Remaining life for the asset is 8.696 years. 
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ATTACHMENT 1: DAMAGE FACTOR CALCULATION SUMMARIES 
(HEADER BOX) 
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 - Number past inspection performed: 1
 - Inspection category: C
 - Inspection effectiveness category: Highly Effectives
Determine the time in-service (age), since the last inspection thickness reading, (trd).
  =  Age: 4 Year (RBI Date)
  =  Age: 14 Year (RBI Plan Date)
  = Trd: mm
 =  = mm/year
 =  = inch = mm
CA: inch = mm
 = (RBI Date)
 = (Plan Date)
 Determine the damage factor for thinning (Dfthin) using Equation (2.13).
 = (RBI Date)
 = (Plan Date)
1)
2)
26
3) Determine the corrosion rate for the base metal (Crbm) based on the material of construction 
and process environment, see Annex 2.B. Where the component has cladding, a corrosion rate 
(Crbm) must also be obtained for the cladding.
Determine the number of inspections, and the corresponding inspection effectiveness 
category. Combine the inspections to the highest effectiveness.
Plan Date
5) For clad components, calculate the time or age from the last inspection required to corrode 
away the clad material (agerc). 
Determine the minimum required wall thickness (tmin) per the original construction code. If the 
component is a tank bottom, then tmin = 0.1 in if the tank does not have a release prevention 
barrier and tmin = 0.05 in if the tank has a release prevention barrier.
Determine the Art parameter, based on the age and from STEP 2, from STEP 3, from STEP 4 
and the age required to corrode away the cladding (agerc) if applicable from STEP 5.
 = N/A
 - For components without cladding, and for components where the cladding is corroded away 
at the time of the last inspection (i.e. agerc= 0.0), use Equation (2.12).
4)
 = 
7)
6)
0
0
0.023
0.1 2.54
1.59
1
1.50
5
1
1
7.5
7.5
0.06
RBI Date
1
1
1
FSM
FOM
1
5
1.50
1
FWD
FAM
FIP
FDL 1
1
𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑐         
𝑡𝑟𝑑− 𝑡
𝐶𝑟,𝑐𝑚
), 0.0]
𝐴𝑟𝑡 = max[1 −
𝑡𝑟𝑑 − 𝐶𝑟,𝑐𝑚    𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛+ 𝐶𝐴
,0.0]
𝐷𝑓
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 =  
𝐷𝑓𝑏
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛   𝐹𝐼𝑃   𝐹𝐷𝐿   𝐹𝑊𝐷   𝐹𝐴𝑀   𝐹𝑆𝑀 
𝐹𝑂𝑀
𝐷𝑓𝑏
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 
𝐷𝑓𝑏
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 
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 - Number past inspection performed: 1
 - Inspection category: C
 - Inspection effectiveness category: Highly Effectives
Determine the time in-service (age), since the last inspection thickness reading, (trd).
  =  Age: Year (RBI Date)
  =  Age: Year (Plan Date)
  =  Trd: mm
 = High
 Based on the susceptibility in STEP 3, determine the severity index (SVI).
 =  = 
 =  = 
 - 
 = (RBI Date)
 = (Plan Date)
Total Damage Factor:
 - 
 = (RBI Date)
 = (Plan Date)
7147.45
30440.9
7154.95
30448.4
8)
9)
26
10)
3.75
14
Determine the susceptibility for cracking based on the operating temperature and 
concentration of the chloride ions. Note that a HIGH susceptibility should be used if cracking is 
Determine the number of inspections, and the corresponding inspection effectiveness 
category. Combine the inspections to the highest effectiveness performed.
Calculate the escalation in the damage factor based on the time in-service since the last 
inspection. In this equation, it is assumed that the probability for cracking will increase with 
time since the last inspection as a result of increased exposure to upset conditions and other 
14)
11)
5000
12)
13)
1670
 Determine the base damage factor for CLSCC, and the highest inspection effectiveness 
determined in STEP 1, and the severity index (SVI) from STEP 4.
𝑆𝑉𝐼
𝐷𝑓𝐵
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶
𝐷𝑓
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶    𝐷𝑓𝐵
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶           
Df−total   𝐷𝑓
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛   𝐷𝑓
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶  
66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“This page is intentionally blank” 
  
67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTACHMENT 2: CONSEQUENCE CALCULATION SUMMARIES 
(HEADER BOX) 
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Representative fluids
 = C1 - C2
Stored Fluid Phase
 = Vapor
Fluid Properties
 - MW : molecular weigh
 = 23 kgb/kg.mol
 - Cp : constant pressure specific heat
 = J/kmol.K
 - R : universal gas constant
 = J/(kg.mol)K
 - k : ideal gas specific heat capacity ratio
 = 
 - Auto-Ignition Temperature, AIT
 = °C
 - Steady State Phase
 = Gas
 - Phase of the fluid stored in equipment
 = Gas
Release Hole Size Diameters, dn
 - Small : 0 - 6.4 mm, (d₁)
 = mm
 - Medium : > 6.4 - 51 mm (d₂)
 = mm
 - large : > 51 - 152 mm (d₃)
 = mm
 - Rupture : > 152 mm (d₄ )
= Min [D, 406] mm = mm
Determine The Generic Failure Frequency, gffn
 - Small (gff₁)
 = failures/yr
 - Medium (gff₂)
 = failures/yr
 - Large (gff₃)
 = failures/yr
 - Rupture (gff₄)
= failures/yr
 = gff tot = failures/yr
Select The Appropiate Release Rate Equation as Described Above Using The Stored Fluid Phase
 = Vapor
Compute The Release Hole Size Area (An)
π : 3.14286
58.1
25
8.00E-06
1.167
6.4
2.00E-05
2.00E-06
6.00E-07
1.1)
1.2)
1.3)
1.4)
2.1)
2.2)
3.1)
3.2)
3.06E-05
102
8.31
155
558
𝑘 =
𝐶𝑝
𝐶𝑝 −𝑅
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 = A₁ = mm²
 = A₂ = mm²
 = A₃ = mm²
 = A₄ = mm²
Calculate The Viscosity Correction Factor, Kv,n (Not Available)
Calculate The Release Rate, Wn
 - Ptrans : transition back pressure (kPa)
Patm : athmospheric pressure   ( kPa )
Ps : storage or normal operating pressure  ( kPa)
 = kPa
 - Ps > Ptrans, then Wn formula is:
Wn : heoritical release rate associated with the nth release hole size (kg/s) 
Cd : release hole coefficient of discharge ( 1 )
C2 : customary conversion factors ( )
gc : gravitational constant ( kg.mol/N.s²)
Ts : storage/ normal operating temperature ( kelvin)
 = W₁ = kg/s
 = W₂ = kg/s
 = W₃ = kg/s
 = W₄ = kg/s
Group Components and Equipment Items Into Inventory Groups:
 = Fin fan cooler & Fin fan
Calculate The Fluid Mass, masscomp
masscomp = ρ x 25% x V 
V = m³
ρ = 470 kg/m³
 = kgs
 = The other tube of fin fan cooler is identic so the masscomp,i is same with masscomp
Calculate The Fluid Mass in The Inventory Group (massinv)
 - total header box = 2
 = kgs
1000
0.05556
7E- 1
0.00911218
0.01822436
450.150
Calculate The Fluid Mass in Each of The Other Components That Are Included in The Inventory 
Group (masscomp,i)
177.453
6205.28
9.53534658
145.497842
2422.01528
5592.93705
101.325
0.9
4.1)
4.2)
4.3)
4.4)
3.3)
32.1829
491.071
8174.57
18876.8
3.4)
𝑊𝑛 = 
𝐶𝑑
𝐶2
x 𝐴𝑛 x 𝑃𝑠 x 
𝑘 𝑥 𝑀𝑊 𝑥 𝑔𝑐
𝑅 𝑥 𝑇𝑠
𝑥
2
𝑘+1
𝑘 1
𝑘−1
𝐴𝑛 = 
  𝑑𝑛
2
4
𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑣 =  𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝,𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
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Calculate The Flow Rate from a 203 mm diameter hole (Wmax8)
 - with An = A8 = mm²
 = kgs
Calculate The Added Fluid Mass, massadd,n
 - massadd₁= )
 = kgs
 - massadd₂= )
 = kgs
 - massadd₃= )
 = kgs
 - massadd₄= )
 = kgs
Calculate The Available Mass For Release
 - massavail,₁ = min[( ), ]
 = kgs
 - massavail,₂= min[( ), ]
 = kgs
 - massavail,₃= min[( ), ]
 = kgs
 - massavail,₄= min[( ), ]
 = kgs
Calculate The Time Required to Release 4,356 kgs (10,000 lbs) of Fluid
 - C₃ : customary conversion factors =
 = t₁ = second
 = t₂ = second
 = t₃ = second
 = t₄ = second
 - 
 - 
d₁ = mm massavail, 1 = kgs t₁ = Continuous
d₂ = mm massavail, 2 = kgs t₂ = Instantaneous
d₃ = mm massavail, 3 = kgs t₃ = Instantaneous
d₄ = mm massavail, 4 = kgs t₄ = Instantaneous
0.01822
1006728.67 0.01822
9614.50
second
second
second
second
If tn <= 180 sec or the release mass is greater than 
4,536 kgs (10,000 lbs), then the release is 
instantaneous; otherwise, the release is continuous
0.01822436
0.01822436
0.01822436
0.01822436
0.8110229
1.87282055
31.1757201
475.7037376.4
25
102
155
9614.49741
1716.36239
26189.6116
32450
For Each Release Hole Size, Determine if The Release Type 
is Instantaneous or Continous Using The Following Criteria
If The Release Hole size is 6.35 mm (0.25 inches) or less, 
then the release type is Continuous
0.8110229
1006728.67
0.01822436
0.01822436
0.01822436
0.01822436
4536
475.703737
31.1757201
1.87282055
26189.6116 0.01822
435962.75
1716.3715
180 x min( 9.54 9614.50
181 x min( 145.50 9614.50
182 x min( 2422.02 9614.50
183 x min( 5592.94
0.01822
4.6)
435962.75
4.7)
5.1)
5.2)
4.5)
𝑊𝑛 = 
𝐶𝑑
𝐶2
x 𝐴𝑛 x 𝑃𝑠 x 
𝑘 𝑥 𝑀𝑊 𝑥 𝑔𝑐
𝑅 𝑥 𝑇𝑠
𝑥
2
𝑘+1
𝑘 1
𝑘−1
𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑑,𝑛 = 180 x min 𝑊𝑛 ,𝑊𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙,𝑛 = min 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 + 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑑,𝑛 ,𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑣
𝑡𝑛 = 
𝐶3
𝑊𝑛
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Determine The Detection and Isolartion Systems Present in The Unit
 - 
Select The Appropiate Classification For The Detection System
 = A
Select The Appropiate Classification For The Isolation System
 = B
Determine The Release Reduction Factor, factdi
 = 
Determine The Total Leak Duration For Each of The Selected Release Hole Sizes, ldmax,n
 =  Idmax,₁ = 30  minutes for 6.4 mm leaks
 =  Idmax,₂ = 20  minutes for 25 mm leaks
 =  Idmax,₃ = 10  minutes for 102 mm leaks
 =  Idmax,₄ = miinutes for 155mm leaks
Calculate The Adjusted Release Rate, raten
 - rate,n = 
 = kg/s
 = kg/s
 = kg/s
 = kg/s
Calculate The Leak Duration, ldn
 = min [{ },{ }]  = seconds
 = min [{ },{ }]  = seconds
 = min [{ },{ }]  = seconds
 = min [{ },{ }]  = seconds
Calculate The Release Mass, massn  
 = min [{ },{ }]  = kgs
 = min [{ },{ }]  = kgs
 = min [{ },{ }]  = kgs
 = min [{ },{ }]  = kgs
Select The Consequence Area Mitigation Reduction Factor, factmit
 = 
 = eneff,₁ =
 = eneff,₂ =
 = eneff,₃ =
 = eneff,₄ =
Determine The Fluid Type
 = Type 0
0.01822
0.00239
0.00016
9.4E-06
0.01822
0.00239 1800
4.1E-06
0.01822
1
-20.5838
rate,₄ =
7.1)
7.2)
0.01822
0.01822
0.00016 1200
9.4E-06 600
0.01822
rate,₁ =
rate,₂ =
rate,₃ =
0.01822
7.62827727
116.398274
1937.61222
6.2)
7.3)
8.1)
8.2)
8.3)
6.1)
6.3)
6.4)
6.5)
4.1E-06
Calculate The Energy Efficiency Correction Factor, eneff,n (not 
applied to continous release)
0.018220.01822 0.01822
0.2
N/A
-20.5838
Detection and isolation system can be detect and 
control the pressure and the gas flow automatically by 
the operator
0.2
0.01667
4474.34964
0.01822 0.01822
-20.5838
𝑊𝑛 1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑑𝑖
𝑙𝑑𝑛 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙,𝑛
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
, 60𝑥𝐼𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑛 = min 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑥 𝐼𝑑𝑛  , 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙,𝑛
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑛 = 4 𝑥 𝑙𝑜𝑔10 𝐶4 𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑛 - 15
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 - Determine The Appropiate Constants a and b
 = 
 = 
 - Because the release is a gas or vapor then use equation:
 = m²
 = kg/s
 - Determine The Appropiate Constants a and b
 = 
 = 
 - Because the release is a gas or vapor then use equation:
 = m²
 = kg/s
 - Determine The Appropiate Constants a and b
 = 
 = 
 - Because the release is a gas or vapor then use equation:
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = kg/s
 = kg/s
 = kg/s
 - Determine The Appropiate Constants a and b
 = 
 = 
 - Because the release is a gas or vapor then use equation:
 = m²
8.67
164
0.62
-0.01718
0.01822
-0.53115
-0.01718
0.01822
0.01822
8.5)
8.6)
8.7)
8.4)
Compute The Component Damage Consequence Areas 
For Autoignition Likely, Continuous Release (AIL-CONT)
50.7969
7.62828
55.1
0.95
303.937
7.62828
Compute The Component Damage Consequence Areas For 
Autoignition Not Likely, Instantaneous Release (AINL-INST)
6.47
0.67
0.98
-0.01718
Compute The Component Damage Consequence Areas For Autoignition Not Likely, 
Continuous Release (AINL-CONT)
Compute The Component Damage Consequence Areas For Autoignition Likely, Instantaneous 
Release (AIL-INST)
𝑎𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 =
𝑏𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 =
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 𝑎(𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛)
𝑏 x 1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,1
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒1
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇=
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,1
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 
𝑎𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 =
𝑏𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 =
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 𝑎(𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛)
𝑏 x 1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒1
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇=
𝑎𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 =
𝑏𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 =
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 𝑎(𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑛)
𝑏 x 
1−𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑛
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑛
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,3
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒3
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇=
𝑎𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 =
𝑏𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 =
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 𝑎(𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑛)
𝑏 x 
1−𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑛
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒4
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇=
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,2
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒2
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇=
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,2
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 
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 = m²
 = m²
 = kg/s
 = kg/s
 = kg/s
 - Determine The Appropiate Constants a and b
 = 
 = 
 - Then the Consequence area:
 = m²
 - Determine The Appropiate Constants a and b
 = 
 = 
 - Then the Consequence area:
 = m²
 - Determine The Appropiate Constants a and b
 = 
 = 
 - Then the Consequence area:
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 - Determine The Appropiate Constants a and b
 = 
 = 
 - Then the Consequence area:
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
21.8
-0.53115
-0.53115
0.01822
0.01822
-0.03309
-1.47728
0.63
-1.47728
-1.47728
8.10)
12.5
0.67
-0.03309
742.789
0.01822
0.92
8.11)
474
Compute The Personnel Injury Consequence Areas For Autoignition Likely, Instantaneous 
Release (AIL-INST)
143
-0.03309
8.8)
8.9)
0.96
122.821
Compute The Personnel Injury Consequence Areas For Autoignition Not Likely, Continuous 
Release (AINL-CONT)
Compute The Personnel Injury Consequence Areas For Autoignition Likely, Continuous Release 
(AIL-CONT)
Compute The Personnel Injury Consequence Areas For Autoignition Not Likely, Instantaneous 
Release (AINL-INST)
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑛
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,3
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒3
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇=
𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 =
𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 =
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 𝑎(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇)𝑏 x 1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,1
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 
𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 =
𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 =
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 𝑎(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇)𝑏 x 1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,1
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 
𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 =
𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 =
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 𝑎(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇)𝑏 x 
1−𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑛
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,3
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 
𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 =
𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 =
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 𝑎(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇)𝑏 x 
1−𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑛
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,3
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒4
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇=
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,4
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒3
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇=
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,3
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,3
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 
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Calculate The Instantaneous/Continuous Blending Factor, factICn
-
C₅ = 
 =  factIC₁ =
 =  factIC₂ = 1
 - 
 =  factIC₃ = 1
 =  factIC₄ = 1
Calculate The AIT Blending Factor, factAIT
 - Ts : kelvin
 - C₆ : 56
 - AIT: kelvin
 - Because Ts + C₆ < AIT then the equation:
 = 0
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
Compute The AIT Blended Consequence Areas For The Component
450.150
831.150
Compute The Continuous/Instantaneous Blended 
Consequence Areas For The Component
92.0045
For Continuous Releases – To smooth out the results for releases that are near the 
continuous to instantaneous transition point (4,536 kgs [10,000 lbs] in 3 minutes, or a 
release rate of 25.2 kg/s [55.6 lb/s]), then the blending factor:
For Instantaneous Releases – Blending is not required. Since the definition of an 
instantaneous release is one with a adjusted release rate, n rate , greater than 25.2 kg/s 
[55.6 lb/s] (4536 kg [10,000 lbs] in 3 minutes), then the blending factor:
25.2
0.3
8.14)
8.15)
8.12)
224.849
0
0
37.1791
0
0
0
0
0
15.3767
0
0
8.13)
0
0
0
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶= min
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐶5
, 1.0
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶= 1.0
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐴𝐼𝑇 =
- 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿 = 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶 + 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 𝑥 1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶  
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,1
𝐴𝐼𝐿 =
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,2
𝐴𝐼𝐿 =
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,3
𝐴𝐼𝐿 =
- 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿 = 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶 + 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 𝑥 1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶  
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,1
𝐴𝐼𝐿 =
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,2
𝐴𝐼𝐿 =
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,3
𝐴𝐼𝐿 =
- 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 = 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶 + 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 𝑥 1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶  
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,1
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 =
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,2
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 =
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 =
- 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 = 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶 + 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 𝑥 1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶  
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,1
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 =
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,2
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 =
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,3
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 =
- 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 = 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐴𝐼𝑇+ 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿  𝑥 1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐴𝐼𝑇 
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,4 = 
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝐴𝐼𝐿 =
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,4
𝐴𝐼𝐿 =
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,3
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 =
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,4
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 =
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 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
Determine The Final Consequence Areas For Component Damage and Personnel Injury
 =  = m²
 =  = m²
8.16)
15.3767
0
0
37.2
0
0
0
0
4.0
9.7
- 𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛 𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡 + 𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,1
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 =
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,2
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 =
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,3
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 =
- 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 = 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐴𝐼𝑇+ 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 𝑥 1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐴𝐼𝑇 
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,1
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 =
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,2
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 =
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,3
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 =
  𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚
= 
∑ 𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑛 𝑥 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚4
𝑛=1
𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚
= 
∑ 𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑛 𝑥 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚4
𝑛=1
𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 =
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,4
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 =
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 ATTACHMENT 3: FINAL RISK ANALYSIS CALCULATION 
SUMMARIES (HEADER BOX) 
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Damage factor total at RBI date
 = Df  = 
Damage factor total at plan date
 = Df  = 
Total generic failure frequency for finfan cooler
 = gff  = 
Total Factor Management System
 = FMS  = 
Probability of Failure at RBI date
 = PoF =
Probability of Failure at plan date
 = PoF =
Total consequence area for equipment damage
 = CAcmd  = 
Total consequence area for personel injury
 = Cainj =
Final consequence area
 = CA  = 
Risk at RBI date
 = Risk =
Risk at Plan date
 = Risk =
Risk Target
 = Risk =
0.109471
Plan Date
Risk Target
RBI Date
4.52817657
0.465860
4.02004968
9.72003041
9.72003041
1.06405824
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7154.94572
30448.3875
0.0000306
50%
6)
7)
8)
9)
1.06406
Date Age Risk
3.71612
12)
10)
11)
3.71612
4.52818
07/17/2017
07/06/2025
07/17/2027
3.75
11.6
14
0
1
2
3
4
5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
R
is
k
 (
m
²/
ye
ar
)
Years
RBI Date VS Plan Date Curve
RBI Date
Plan Date
Risk
Target
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Determine damage factor at risk target
Determine new damage factor
 - Proposed Inspection:
Calculate new thinning damage factor:
 - Previous thinning inspection at:
 =  = 1C
 - Propose thinning inspection at target date
 =  = 1A
 - Thinning inspection effectiveness after proposed thinning inspection executed at plan date:
 = 1C + 1A  = 1.25A
 - Art value at plan date: 
 = 
 - Then new thinning damage factor:
 =  = 
Calculate new CL-SCC damage factor :
 - Proposed CLSCC inspection at target date 
 =  = 1A
 - Age at the plan end date:
 = Age plan  = Plan date - Last inspection date
 =  - 
 = years
Determine the severity index (SVI).
 =  = 
 =  = 
0.45 200 80
2A
30
38.7866
40
13)
Age Risk DF
Plan Date 14 4.52818 30448.4
RBI Date 3.75 1.06406 7154.95
Risk Target 11.5972 3.71612 24988
Df thin 2720.62 ? 4158.99
Df cl-scc 1069.98 ? 4557.02
14)
RBI date Target date Plan Date
> Thinning Inspection (It should be 2A thinning inspection since we need to lower DF as 
many as possible)
> CLSCC Inspection (It should be 2A thinning inspection since we need to lower DF as 
many as possible)
15)
10/17/2013
07/06/2025
Df total 3790.6 24988 /lower 8716.01
10/17/2013
11.6
17)
5000
18) Determine the base damage factor for CLSCC based on the new inspection effectiveness and 
the severity index (SVI) from the last step.
0.44393
76.9665
16)
07/06/2025
07/06/2025
Art 1A 1.25A
0.4 130 55
0.44393 191.506 76.9665
250
𝐷𝑓
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 
𝑆𝑉𝐼
𝐷𝑓𝐵
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶
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 - 
 = 
Total Damage Factor:
 - 
 = 
Calculate risk at plan date with inspection
 - Fms  = 
 - gff total  = 
 - POF with Inspection  = Failure/year
 - COF with inspection  = m²
 - Risk area with inspection  = m²/year0.56251
20)
50%
0.0000306
0.05787
9.72
19) Calculate the escalation in the damage factor based on the time in-service since the last 
inspection. In this equation, it is assumed that the probability for cracking will increase with 
time since the last inspection as a result of increased exposure to upset conditions and other 
non-normal conditions.
3705
3782.44
𝐷𝑓
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶    𝐷𝑓𝐵
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶           
Df−total   𝐷𝑓
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛   𝐷𝑓
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶  
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ATTACHMENT 4: DAMAGE FACTOR CALCULATION SUMMARIES 
(TUBE) 
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 - Number past inspection performed: 1
 - Inspection category: A
 - Inspection effectiveness category: Highly Effectives
Determine the time in-service (age), since the last inspection thickness reading, (trd).
  =  Age: Year (RBI Date)
  =  Age: Year (Plan Date)
  = Trd: mm
 =  = mm/year
 =  = mm
 = P = Design Pressure  = kPa
 = Rc = inside Radius in corroded condition  = 14 mm
 = S = Allowable design stress  = kPa
 = E = Weld point efficiency = 
 = D = Tube diameter =1 in = mm
 = CA = Corrosion Allowance = mm
 = Rc = inside Radius in corroded condition  = 14 mm
CA: mm
 = (RBI Date)
 = ( Plan Date)
 Determine the damage factor for thinning, Dfthin, using Equation (2.15).
0.44393
Determine the number of inspections, and the corresponding inspection effectiveness 
category. Combine the inspections to the highest effectiveness.
Determine the Art parameter, based on the age and from STEP 2, from STEP 3, from STEP 4 
and the age required to corrode away the cladding (agerc) if applicable from STEP 5.
 = N/A
1.27
0.023
3.75
6502.28
99284.5
1.27
4)
 = 
7)
6)
 - For components without cladding, and for components where the cladding is corroded away 
at the time of the last inspection (i.e. agerc= 0.0), use Equation (2.13).
5) For clad components, calculate the time or age from the last inspection required to corrode 
away the clad material (agerc). 
Determine the minimum required wall thickness (tmin) per the original construction code or 
using API 579 with the following formula. If the component is a tank bottom, tmin = 0.1 in if 
the tank does not have a release prevention barrier and tmin = 0.05 in if the tank has a release 
0.34804
25.4
1.13
0.85
1)
2)
1.65
3) Determine the corrosion rate for the base metal (Crbm) based on the material of construction 
and process environment. Where the component has cladding, a corrosion rate (Crbm) must 
also be obtained for the cladding.
13.75
𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑐         
𝑡𝑟𝑑− 𝑡
𝐶𝑟,𝑐𝑚
), 0.0]
𝐴𝑟𝑡 = max[1 −
𝑡𝑟𝑑 − 𝐶𝑟,𝑐𝑚    𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛+ 𝐶𝐴
,0.0]
𝐷𝑓
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 =  
𝐷𝑓𝑏
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛   𝐹𝐼𝑃   𝐹𝐷𝐿   𝐹𝑊𝐷   𝐹𝐴𝑀   𝐹𝑆𝑀 
𝐹𝑂𝑀
𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝐶 =  
𝑃 𝑥 𝑅𝑐
𝑆 𝑥   − 0.6𝑃
 
𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝐶
𝑅𝑐 =  
𝐷 +   𝑥 𝐶𝐴
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 = (RBI Date)
 = (Plan Date)
2720.62
4158.99
RBI Date
1
1
1
831.799
Plan Date
FIP
FDL
FWD
FAM
544.124
1
1
1
5
1
1
5
FSM
FOM
1
1
𝐷𝑓𝑏
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 
𝐷𝑓
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 
 - Number past inspection performed: 1
 - Inspection category: A
 - Inspection effectiveness category: Highly Effectives
Determine the time in-service (age), since the last inspection thickness reading, (trd).
  =  Age: Year (RBI Date)
  =  Age: 14 Year (Plan Date)
  =  Trd: mm
 = High
 Based on the susceptibility in STEP 3, determine the severity index (SVI).
 =  = 
 =  = 
 - 
 = (RBI Date)
 = (Plan Date)
Total Damage Factor:
 - 
 = (RBI Date)
 = (Plan Date)
1070
4557
3790.6
8716.01
14)
11)
5000
12)
13)
250
 Determine the base damage factor for CLSCC, and the highest inspection effectiveness 
determined in STEP 1, and the severity index (SVI) from STEP 4.
Calculate the escalation in the damage factor based on the time in-service since the last 
inspection. In this equation, it is assumed that the probability for cracking will increase with 
time since the last inspection as a result of increased exposure to upset conditions and other 
8)
9)
1.65
10)
Determine the number of inspections, and the corresponding inspection effectiveness 
category. Combine the inspections to the highest effectiveness performed.
3.75
Determine the susceptibility for cracking based on the operating temperature and 
concentration of the chloride ions. Note that a HIGH susceptibility should be used if cracking is 
𝑆𝑉𝐼
𝐷𝑓𝐵
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶
𝐷𝑓
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶    𝐷𝑓𝐵
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶           
Df−total   𝐷𝑓
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛   𝐷𝑓
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶  
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ATTACHMENT 5: CONSEQUENCE CALCULATION SUMMARIES (TUBE) 
  
86 
 
 
 
 
  
Representative fluids
 = C1 - C2
Stored Fluid Phase
 = Vapor
Fluid Properties
 - MW : molecular weigh
 = 23 kgb/kg.mol
 - Cp : constant pressure specific heat
 = J/kmol.K
 - R : universal gas constant
 = J/(kg.mol)K
 - k : ideal gas specific heat capacity ratio
 = 
 - Auto-Ignition Temperature, AIT
 = °C
 - Steady State Phase
 = Gas
 - Phase of the fluid stored in equipment
 = Gas
Release Hole Size Diameters, dn
 - Small : 0 - 6.4 mm, (d₁)
 = mm
 - Rupture : > 152 mm (d₄ )
= Min [D, 406] mm = mm
Determine The Generic Failure Frequency, gffn
 - Small (gff₁)
 = failures/yr
 - Rupture (gff₄)
= failures/yr
 = gff tot = failures/yr
Select The Appropiate Release Rate Equation as Described Above Using The Stored Fluid Phase
 = Vapor
Compute The Release Hole Size Area (An)
π :
 = A₁ = mm²
 = A₄ = mm²
Calculate The Viscosity Correction Factor, Kv,n (Not Available)
Calculate The Release Rate, Wn
 - Ptrans : transition back pressure (kPa)
Patm : athmospheric pressure   ( kPa )
3.14286
101.325
3.06E-05
8.31
32.1829
18876.8
3.4)
155
558
1.1)
1.2)
1.3)
1.4)
2.1)
2.2)
3.1)
3.2)
3.3)
58.1
2.80E-05
1.167
6.4
2.60E-06
𝑘 =
𝐶𝑝
𝐶𝑝 −𝑅
𝐴𝑛 = 
  𝑑𝑛
2
4
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Ps : storage or normal operating pressure  ( kPa)
 = kPa
 - Ps > Ptrans, then Wn formula is:
Wn : heoritical release rate associated with the nth release hole size (kg/s) 
Cd : release hole coefficient of discharge ( 1 )
C2 : customary conversion factors ( )
gc : gravitational constant ( kg.mol/N.s²)
Ts : storage/ normal operating temperature ( kelvin)
 = W₁ = kg/s
 = W₄ = kg/s
Group Components and Equipment Items Into Inventory Groups:
 = Fin fan cooler & Fin fan
Calculate The Fluid Mass, masscomp
masscomp = ρ x 25% x V 
V = m³
ρ = 470 kg/m³
 = kgs
 = The other tube of fin fan cooler is identic so the masscomp,i is same with masscomp
Calculate The Fluid Mass in The Inventory Group (massinv)
 - total tubes =
 = kgs
Calculate The Flow Rate from a 203 mm diameter hole (Wmax8)
 - with An = A8 = mm²
 = kgs
Calculate The Added Fluid Mass, massadd,n
 - massadd₁= )
 = kgs
 - massadd₄= )
 = kgs
Calculate The Available Mass For Release
6205.28
9.53534658
5592.93705
0.9
Calculate The Fluid Mass in Each of The Other Components That Are Included in The Inventory 
Group (masscomp,i)
1000
450.150
177.453
115
9614.49741
1716.36239
32450
1006728.67
9614.50183 x min( 5592.94
180 x min( 9.5353 9614.50
4.1)
4.7)
4.2)
4.3)
4.4)
4.5)
4.6)
0.331
7E- 1
0.054284
6.24266
𝑊𝑛 = 
𝐶𝑑
𝐶2
x 𝐴𝑛 x 𝑃𝑠 x 
𝑘 𝑥 𝑀𝑊 𝑥 𝑔𝑐
𝑅 𝑥 𝑇𝑠
𝑥
2
𝑘+1
𝑘 1
𝑘−1
𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑣 =  𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝,𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑊𝑛 = 
𝐶𝑑
𝐶2
x 𝐴𝑛 x 𝑃𝑠 x 
𝑘 𝑥 𝑀𝑊 𝑥 𝑔𝑐
𝑅 𝑥 𝑇𝑠
𝑥
2
𝑘+1
𝑘 1
𝑘−1
𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑑,𝑛 = 180 x min 𝑊𝑛 ,𝑊𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙,𝑛 = min 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 + 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑑,𝑛 ,𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑣
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 - massavail,₁ = min[( ), ]
 = kgs
 - massavail,₄= min[( ), ]
 = kgs
Calculate The Time Required to Release 4,356 kgs (10,000 lbs) of Fluid
 - C₃ : customary conversion factors =
 = t₁ = second
 = t₄ = second
 - 
 - 
d₁ = mm massavail, 1 = kgs t₁ = Continuous
d₄ = mm massavail, 4 = kgs t₄ = Instantaneous
Determine The Detection and Isolartion Systems Present in The Unit
 - 
Select The Appropiate Classification For The Detection System
 = A
Select The Appropiate Classification For The Isolation System
 = B
Determine The Release Reduction Factor, factdi
 = 
Determine The Total Leak Duration For Each of The Selected Release Hole Sizes, ldmax,n
 =  Idmax,₁ = 30  minutes for 6.4 mm leaks
 =  Idmax,₂ = 20  minutes for 25 mm leaks
 =  Idmax,₃ = 10  minutes for 102 mm leaks
 =  Idmax,₄ = miinutes for 155mm leaks
Calculate The Adjusted Release Rate, raten
 - rate,n = 
 = kg/s
 = kg/s
Calculate The Leak Duration, ldn
 = min [{ },{ }]  = seconds
 = min [{ },{ }]  = seconds0.0014
For Each Release Hole Size, Determine if The Release Type 
is Instantaneous or Continous Using The Following Criteria
If The Release Hole size is 6.35 mm (0.25 inches) or less, 
then the release type is Continuous
0.8110229
6.24266
6.24266
4536
475.703737
1006728.67 6.24266
0.0014
5.1)
5.2)
6.1)
6.3)
6.4)
6.5)
6.2)
0.01667
4474.34964rate,₄ =
1
rate,₁ = 7.62827727
0.81836 1800 0.81836
6.24266
second
second
If tn <= 180 sec or the release mass is greater than 
4,536 kgs (10,000 lbs), then the release is 
instantaneous; otherwise, the release is continuous
6.24266
6.24266
0.8110229
475.7037376.4
155
7.1)
7.2)
Detection and isolation system can be detect and 
control the pressure and the gas flow automatically by 
the operator
0.2
1716.41667
𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙,𝑛 min 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 + 𝑎𝑑𝑑,𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑣
𝑡𝑛 = 
𝐶3
𝑊𝑛
𝑊𝑛 1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑑𝑖
𝑙𝑑𝑛 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙,𝑛
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
, 60𝑥𝐼𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑛
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Calculate The Release Mass, massn  
 = min [{ },{ }]  = kgs
 = min [{ },{ }]  = kgs
Select The Consequence Area Mitigation Reduction Factor, factmit
 = 
 = eneff,₄ =
Determine The Fluid Type
 = Type 0
 - Determine The Appropiate Constants a and b
 = 
 = 
 - Because the release is a gas or vapor then use equation:
 = m²
 = kg/s
 - Determine The Appropiate Constants a and b
 = 
 = 
 - Because the release is a gas or vapor then use equation:
 = m²
 = kg/s
 - Determine The Appropiate Constants a and b
 = 
 = 
 - Because the release is a gas or vapor then use equation:
 = m²
 = kg/s
-1.69013
6.24266
Compute The Component Damage Consequence Areas For Autoignition Not Likely, 
Instantaneous Release (AINL-INST)
Compute The Component Damage Consequence Areas For Autoignition Likely, Continuous 
Release (AIL-CONT)
50.7969
7.62828
Calculate The Energy Efficiency Correction Factor, eneff,n (not 
applied to continous release)
0.2
8.5)
8.6)
8.4)
7.3)
8.1)
8.2)
8.3)
6.24266 6.24266
0.98
-10.4449
Compute The Component Damage Consequence Areas For Autoignition Not Likely, 
Continuous Release (AINL-CONT)
8.67
55.1
0.95
303.937
7.62828
6.47
0.67
6.24266
6.24266 6.24266 6.24266
𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑛 = min 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑥 𝐼𝑑𝑛  , 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙,𝑛
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑛 = 4 𝑥 𝑙𝑜𝑔10 𝐶4 𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑛 - 15
𝑎𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 =
𝑏𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 =
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 𝑎(𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛)
𝑏 x 1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,1
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒1
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇=
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,1
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 
𝑎𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 =
𝑏𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 =
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 𝑎(𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛)
𝑏 x 1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒1
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇=
𝑎𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 =
𝑏𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 =
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 𝑎(𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑛)
𝑏 x 
1−𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑛
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑛
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒4
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇=
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 - Determine The Appropiate Constants a and b
 = 
 = 
 - Because the release is a gas or vapor then use equation:
 = m²
 = kg/s
 - Determine The Appropiate Constants a and b
 = 
 = 
 - Then the Consequence area:
 = m²
 - Determine The Appropiate Constants a and b
 = 
 = 
 - Then the Consequence area:
 = m²
 - Determine The Appropiate Constants a and b
 = 
 = 
 - Then the Consequence area:
 = m²
 - Determine The Appropiate Constants a and b
 = 
 = 
 - Then the Consequence area:
-39.0269
6.24266
0.92
0.67
742.789
Compute The Personnel Injury Consequence Areas For Autoignition Not Likely, Continuous 
Release (AINL-CONT)
Compute The Personnel Injury Consequence Areas For Autoignition Likely, Continuous Release 
(AIL-CONT)
Compute The Personnel Injury Consequence Areas For Autoignition Not Likely, Instantaneous 
Release (AINL-INST)
21.8
164
0.62
0.96
122.821
0.63
8.7)
8.8)
8.9)
Compute The Component Damage Consequence Areas For Autoignition Likely, Instantaneous 
Release (AIL-INST)
8.11)
474
Compute The Personnel Injury Consequence Areas For Autoignition Likely, Instantaneous 
Release (AIL-INST)
143
-3.25538
8.10)
12.5
𝑎𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 =
𝑏𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 =
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 𝑎(𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑛)
𝑏 x 
1−𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑛
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑛
𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 =
𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 =
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 𝑎(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇)𝑏 x 1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,1
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 
𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 =
𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 =
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 𝑎(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇)𝑏 x 1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,1
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇= 
𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 =
𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 =
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 𝑎(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇)𝑏 x 
1−𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑛
𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 =
𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 =
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 𝑎(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇)𝑏 x 
1−𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑛
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒4
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇=
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 
𝐴𝐼𝐿 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 
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 = m²
Calculate The Instantaneous/Continuous Blending Factor, factICn
-
C₅ =  = 
 - 
 =  factIC₄ = 1
Calculate The AIT Blending Factor, factAIT
 - Ts : kelvin
 - C₆ : 56
 - AIT: kelvin
 - Because Ts + C₆ < AIT then the equation:
 = 0
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
Compute The AIT Blended Consequence Areas For The Component
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
 = m²
Determine The Final Consequence Areas For Component Damage and Personnel Injury
 = m²
 = m²
 factIC₁ =
14.1
34.0
25.2
0
-115.068
450.150
558.000
Compute The Continuous/Instantaneous Blended 
Consequence Areas For The Component
92.0045
For Continuous Releases – To smooth out the results for releases that are near the 
continuous to instantaneous transition point (4,536 kgs [10,000 lbs] in 3 minutes, or a 
release rate of 25.2 kg/s [55.6 lb/s]), then the blending factor:
For Instantaneous Releases – Blending is not required. Since the definition of an 
instantaneous release is one with a adjusted release rate, n rate , greater than 25.2 kg/s 
[55.6 lb/s] (4536 kg [10,000 lbs] in 3 minutes), then the blending factor:
0.3
8.16)
224.849
-115.068
37.1791
15.3767
37.1791
0
0
0
0
8.15)
15.3767
8.13)
8.12)
8.14)
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶= min
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
𝐶5
, 1.0
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶= 1.0
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐴𝐼𝑇 =
- 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿 = 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶 + 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 𝑥 1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶  
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,1
𝐴𝐼𝐿 =
- 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿 = 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶 + 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 𝑥 1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶  
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,1
𝐴𝐼𝐿 =
- 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 = 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶 + 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 𝑥 1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶  
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,1
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 =
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 =
- 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 = 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶 + 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 𝑥 1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑛
𝐼𝐶  
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,1
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 =
- 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 = 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐴𝐼𝑇+ 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿  𝑥 1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐴𝐼𝑇 
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,1
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 =
- 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 = 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝐿  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐴𝐼𝑇+ 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 𝑥 1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐴𝐼𝑇 
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,1
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 =
  𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚
= 
∑ 𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑛 𝑥 𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,𝑛
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚4
𝑛=1
𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 = 
∑ 𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑛 𝑥 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑛
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚4
𝑛=1
𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,4
𝐴𝐼𝐿−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇= 
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝐴𝐼𝐿 =
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,4
𝐴𝐼𝐿 =
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,4
𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿 =
𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑚𝑑,4
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 =
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗,4
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 =
92 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“This page is intentionally blank” 
  
93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTACHMENT 6: FINAL RISK ANALYSIS CALCULATION SUMMARIES 
(TUBE) 
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Damage factor total at RBI date
 = Df  = 
Damage factor total at plan date
 = Df  = 
Total generic failure frequency for finfan cooler
 = gff  = 
Total Factor Management System
 = FMS  = 
Probability of Failure at RBI date
 = PoF =
Probability of Failure at plan date
 = PoF =
Total consequence area for equipment damage
 = CAcmd  = 
Total consequence area for personel injury
 = Cainj =
Final consequence area
 = CA  = 
Risk at RBI date
 = Risk =
Risk at Plan date
 = Risk =
Risk Target
 = Risk =
11)
Date Age Risk
12)
3.71612
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
3790.59769
8716.0138
0.0000306
50%
0.057996
0.133355
14.0701739
34.0201064
34.0201064
1.97303502
4.53675167
RBI Plan Date
Risk Target
RBI Date 1.97304
3.71612
4.53675
07/17/2017
07/06/2024
07/17/2027
3.75
10.7
14
0
1
2
3
4
5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
R
is
k 
(m
²/
ye
ar
)
Years
RBI Date VS Plan Date Curve
RBI Date
Plan
Date
Risk
Target
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Determine damage factor at risk target
Determine new damage factor
 - Proposed Inspection:
Calculate new thinning damage factor:
 - Previous thinning inspection at:
 =  = 1A
 - Propose thinning inspection at target date
 =  = 2A
 - Thinning inspection effectiveness after proposed thinning inspection executed at plan date:
 = 1A + 2A  = 3A
 - Art value at plan date: 
 = 
 - Then new thinning damage factor:
 =  = 
Calculate new CL-SCC damage factor :
 - Proposed CLSCC inspection at target date 
 =  = 2A
 - Age at the plan end date:
 = Age plan  = Plan date - Last inspection date
 =  - 
 = years
Determine the severity index (SVI).
 =  = 
 =  = 
 - 
 = 679
Determine the base damage factor for CLSCC based on the new inspection effectiveness and 
the severity index (SVI) from the last step.
Calculate the escalation in the damage factor based on the time in-service since the last 
inspection. In this equation, it is assumed that the probability for cracking will increase with 
time since the last inspection as a result of increased exposure to upset conditions and other 
non-normal conditions.
5000
18)
50
19)
07/06/2024 10/17/2013
10.7
17)
0.44393
191.506
16)
07/06/2024
> Thinning Inspection (It should be 2A thinning inspection since we need to lower DF as 
many as possible)
> CLSCC Inspection (It should be 2A thinning inspection since we need to lower DF as 
many as possible)
15)
10/17/2013
07/06/2024
Target date
?
?
/lower
RBI Date 1.97304
Risk Target 3.71612
13)
Risk DF
3790.6
7139.42
8716.01
Age
3.75
14)
10.719
14Plan Date 4.53675
Df total
RBI date
2720.62
1069.98
3790.6
Df thin
Df cl-scc
7139.42
Plan Date
4158.99
4557.02
8716.01
𝐷𝑓
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 
𝑆𝑉𝐼
𝐷𝑓𝐵
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶
𝐷𝑓
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶    𝐷𝑓𝐵
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶           
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Total Damage Factor:
 - 
 = 
Calculate risk at plan date with inspection
 - Fms  = 
 - gff total  = 
 - POF with Inspection  = Failure/year
 - COF with inspection  = m²
 - Risk area with inspection  = m²/year
34
0.01333
0.45333
50%
0.0000306
20)
870.93
Df−total   𝐷𝑓
𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛   𝐷𝑓
𝐶𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶  
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